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Introduction: 
Jewish and Latino Immigration in a “city under fire” 
 
On April 10, 2008 the Boston Globe published an article in commemoration of the 100th 
anniversary of the Great Chelsea Fire of 1908. Entitled “When Chelsea Burned,” the article 
provided four theories explaining why Chelsea burned on that fateful morning in mid-April: 
either a smoker dumped his ashes near a lot full of rags, a group of mischievous kids gave into 
the temptation of pyromania, a gluttonous business owner committed arson for insurance money, 
or the ever-so-flammable rags spontaneously combusted. It seemed odd to the author that in a 
city notorious for bursting into flames—the city burnt again during the Great Fire of 1973—
nobody knew who or what ignited the devastating conflagration. Yet to those who are familiar 
with the history of Chelsea and her residents—and indeed there are very few of us—the question 
of who or what burned Chelsea is neither here nor there. From 1834 to 1997, Chelsea endured 
over thirty fires of considerable (if not appalling) size not because the city was full of smokers or 
deranged businessman, but because the city itself was under fire. Cast into the crossfire of 
industrialization and demographic flux, Chelsea suffered as people, industry, and financial 
assistance migrated in and out of the small city. Industry, poor housing quality, oil tanks, 
municipal incompetence and the Mystic River Bridge, are just a sampling of the many factors 
that besieged Chelsea and erupted in fire throughout the twentieth century. 1
 Chelsea’s unique spectrum of urban problems, however, only explains the trials and 
tribulations leading up to the Great Fires of 1908 and 1973 and not the events created by them. In 
Chelsea, escalating urban crisis occurred simultaneously with rapidly growing immigrant 
2 
 
populations. In the years before the fire of 1908, Jewish immigration pushed Chelsea to the brink 
of demographic succession; likewise, in the handful of years before the fire of 1973, Latino 
migrations forced Chelsea to recognize the changing dynamic of a once-homogenous city. As 
isolated events, the Great Fire of 1908 and the Great Fire of 1973 were urban disasters, but as 
decisive moments in the local history of Jewish and Latino immigrants, the fires were nodal 
points in the interplay between urban-industrial life, urban crisis and immigration. 
 Extraordinary events such as fires expose the machinery of spatial and social order. 
While the destructive quality of conflagration fills the air with suspended trauma, the leveling 
effects of rampant flames provoke immediate and dynamic riposte.  In the aftermath of urban 
turmoil, the reconstructive process not only restores infrastructure to the city’s skyline but a 
sense of order to the economic and social hierarchies. The relationships between the rich and the 
poor, capital and labor, and immigrants and natives, are dependent upon the scaffolding of the 
city itself; and thus to rebuild the urban is to make and unmake the destinies of the city’s people. 
The phenomenal effect of fire on the urban milieu is chronicled in Karen Sawislak’s narrative of 
the Great Chicago Fire, Smoldering City: Chicagoans and the Great Fire, 1871-1874. Through 
exploration of the reconstructive processes, Sawislak unearthed how commercial interests, 
popular opinion, and public interests emerged as combatants—and protagonists—in the struggle 
for the city. Though Smoldering City is not a history of Chicago’s immigrant populations, the 
narrative nonetheless identifies the methodology of disaster relief and renewal as the key to the 
livelihood of interested parties. In the case of Chelsea, both the early Jewish population and the 
later Latino population had much at stake during the aftermath of the fire. As new members of 
American society and new contenders in the urban arena, the destructive effects of the fire 
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produced an unparalleled degree of uncertainty in their communities. The sudden efflux of 
residents and businesses presented new opportunities for resourceful migrants to exert agency 
and prerogative in the urban milieu. In the years following the Great Fires of 1908 and 1973, 
Jews and Latino opened small-businesses and fortified kinship networks that accelerated the 
continued growth of their ethnic communities. At the beginning of the twentieth century, many 
referred to Chelsea as “the Jerusalem of America,” but by the end of the century nicknames for 
Chelsea included “little San Juan” and later on “ChelSalvador.” 2
The divergent paths of Jewish and Latino Chelsea shed light onto the relationship and 
interconnectedness between urban industrial life, urban crisis and immigrant neighborhoods. The 
same industrial characteristics that launched Jews into the suburbs prevented Latinos from 
leaving the inner urban area. As is evidenced by Llana Barber in her dissertation entitled “Latino 
Migration and the New Global Cities: Transnationalism, Race and Urban Crisis in Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, 1945-2000,” the effects of national phenomenon such as deindustrialization and 
suburbanization—or “white flight”—were most acutely felt in small cities such as Lawrence or 
Chelsea. Mass migrations to suburbia induced urban disinvestment, and deindustrialization 
spurred economic decline. Although the combined effects of demographic decline and 
deindustrialization eventually spelled urban crisis, lingering industrial cities experiencing 
demographic efflux, moreover, destined Lawrence and Chelsea to be primary recipients of 
Latino migrations. Just as industrialization provided the framework for the upward trajectory of 
the Jewish population, suburbanization and urban disinvestment laid the parameters that 
restricted the upward (and outward) trajectory of Latinos. 3
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Located on the frontline of urban phenomena and perpetually under siege, the city of 
Chelsea and her residents had long lists of grievances. Change had occurred quickly; and as 
memories of the past influenced perceptions of the future, Chelsea became the battleground of 
the struggle between “Old Chelsea” and “New Chelsea.”   At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, many mourned the death of the pastoral town as the influx of capital and labor shaped 
the city’s industrial and ethnic character. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Chelsea had 
been a country retreat and summer playground for Boston’s leaders, but as dramatic population 
growth ensued, urbanization threatened the city’s rural roots and was resented by many older 
Yankee residents. Walter Merriam Pratt, the author of The Seven Generations of Chelsea and 
Prattville and The Burning of Chelsea, was one of the most vocal opponents of industrialization 
and Jewish migration.  
Why is it, then, that during, the few years previous to the fire Chelsea had lost so many 
desirable citizens? Why was it that in less than fifty years it had entirely lost its standing 
as the most aristocratic suburb of Boston, a place where people came to spend their 
summers. . . How was it possible for a city of wealth, with a population of ten to fifteen 
thousand, to change in so short a time to a business and manufacturing community with a 
population of forty thousand, including ten thousand Hebrews?4
Much in the same way that Pratt blamed the Jews for Chelsea’s changing environment, many 
white-ethnics conflated Latino growth with urban decline. During the seventies, accounts of the 
city’s escalating narcotics trade, for instance, overwhelmingly blamed Hispanics for the 
introduction of drugs.  In more recent years, one of the librarians at the Chelsea Public Library 
referred to the Latinos as “all the undesirables.”  Although constituents of “Old Chelsea” tended 
to attach culpability to immigrants, the true culprits of urban crisis were circumstances out of the 
city’s control.5
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A Brief Overview of Chelsea 
 In 1624 Samuel Maverick founded Winisimmet—which occupied the present areas of 
Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop. Located at the intersection between two rivers and facing the 
harbor, the settlement was the ideal place to establish a trading post. Shortly thereafter, 
Winnisimmet became the location of the country’s first ferry. In 1631, the General Court of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony granted approval for a privately owned ferry to operate between the 
settlement and Boston, and with that began the first water route between Boston and its environs. 
In 1634, Boston incorporated Winnisimmet as a part of the city and a hundred years later, in 
1739, an act passed by the Great and General Court of Boston declared Chelsea as its own 
township.  From the end of the Revolutionary War onwards, Chelsea rose to prominence as a 
retreat for Boston’s elite. Many city leaders stayed at the Highland Park House, the grand resort 
of New England, and others built their mansions on either Powderhorn Hill or Mount 
Bellingham.6
Accessibility defined Chelsea’s demographic development during the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In 1831 the operators of the Chelsea ferry decreased the toll to three cents 
and initiated a period of tremendous population growth. Between 1830 and 1840, the population 
tripled from 770 persons to 2,182 persons, and by 1900 Chelsea boasted a population of just over 
34,000. At the turn of the twentieth century, Chelsea was Boston’s single most accessible suburb. 
The Chelsea-Charlestown Bridge, the Chelsea Street Bridge, the Chelsea and East Boston 
Railway, the Lynn and Boston Street Railway, the Boston Revere Beach and Lynn Railroad, and 
the Revere Beach Parkway were just a handful of the roads, railways, and bridges that had 
emerged over the past century. In the words of Walter Merriam Pratt—who in addition to being 
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an author of local history was a member of one of Chelsea’s wealthiest families—Chelsea was 
“the easiest to reach of all the suburbs of Boston, being connected with it by the Winnisimmet 
Ferry, the Boston Elevated by the East Boston Tunnel, the Boston and Northern Electric line, and 
the Boston and Maine Railroad. From Chelsea Square to Scollay Sqaure, in Boston, the running 
time is but thirteen minutes.”7
 Chelsea’s proximity to Boston and its multiple venues of transportation inevitably 
attracted industry to the city’s waterfront and interior. Chelsea’s earliest industry was 
shipbuilding. Yet due to the introduction of steel ships, many of the shipyards closed during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Regardless, the innate value and accessibility of the 
waterfront property encouraged further industrial development. During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Chelsea witnessed the maturation of local industries that included—but 
were not limited to—coal, shipping, chemical processing, shoe manufacturing, clock production, 
and the gamut of enterprises dependent upon recycled materials (i.e. “junk business”).  The 
growing presence of these factories transformed Chelsea into an industrial city. While the 
production of oils, paints, and varnishes dominated the industrial economy during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, shoe manufacturing and oil production rose to prominence during 
the early part of the twentieth century. By the time the Jews arrived in Chelsea, the industrial 
fabric of the city was incredibly diverse. Producers of shoes, rubber goods, elastic fabric, boxes, 
steel and wallpapers—to name a few—all shared the same 1.8 square miles of city.8
 
1 Katheleen Conti, “When Chelsea Burned,” Boston Globe, April 10, 2008.  
2 Karen Sawislak, Smoldering City: Chicagoans and the Great Fire, 1871-1874 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995); Isildro Vega, interview by Lake Coreth, March 25, 2011; Norman Finkelstein, interview by Lake 
Coreth, November 16, 2010. 
3 Llana Barber, “Latino Migration and the New Global Cities: Transnationalism, Race and Urban Crisis in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1945-2000” (PhD diss., Boston College, 2010). 
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4 Walter Merriam Pratt, The Burning of Chelsea (Boston: Sampson Publishing Company, 1908), 28-29.  
5 Survey of Industrial Sites, Chelsea Public Library Archives, Boston.  
6 “Samuel Maverick,” Chelsea Historical Society, accessed April 11, 2011, 
http://www.olgp.net/chs/d1/sammaverick.htm; Pratt, Burning of Chelsea, 15-17; “Chelsea’s Population Through the 
Years,” Chelsea Historical Society, accessed April 11, 2011, http://www.olgp.net/chs/people/population.htm 
7 “Important Events in Chelsea’s History,” Chelsea Historical Society, accessed April 7, 2011, 
http://www.olgp.net/chs/timeline.htm; “Winnisimmet Ferry,” Chelsea Historical Society, accessed April 7, 2011, 
http://www.olgp.net/chs/d2/ferry.htm; Pratt, Burning of Chelsea, 29. 
8 Cynthia K. Orellana, Melissa Quirk, Melanie N. Spencer, and Yvette Villa, “Chelsea Economic Development 
Community Impacts” (report, Department of Urban & Environmental Policy and Planning, Tufts University, 
Boston, 2006); “Shipbuilding Industry in Chelsea,” Chelsea Historical Society, accessed February 16, 2011, 
http://www.olgp.net/chs/d4/shipbuilding.htm. 
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Chapter One: 
Cinders of Jerusalem: Industrial Succession and the Rise of Jewish Chelsea, 1890-
1950 
Dear Old Chelsea 
I've just been back in Chelsea, Bill, I've seen a city new, 
The place has changed so greatly. Its made me fearfully blue. 
Familiar scenes are missing, Bill, The fire, don't you know, 
It altered almost everything, Some twenty years ago. 
-Walter Merriam Pratt, 19281
 
 Arriving in Boston at the turn of the twentieth century, the Jews of Chelsea established 
their community during the vanguard of Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe and Russia. In 
1890, just eighty-two Jews lived in Chelsea. But by 1910 their numbers had grown to 11,000, 
comprising one-third of the city’s population. Notwithstanding the damages and crisis caused by 
the Great Fire of 1908, Chelsea remained a major destination for Europe’s Jewish migrants.  
Confronted with the task of recovery and unfavorable public opinion, Chelsea rose from the 
ashes of the conflagration as a community renewed. A period of tremendous industrialization 
quelled the wake of the fire, and as industry hummed so, too, did the Jewish population. 
Evolving up until the 1950s, Jewish Chelsea was both the ideal destination and point of departure 
for Jewish immigrants. Seeded with first generation Jews and plentiful employment 
opportunities, Chelsea was a staging area for a population in transition. As a midpoint between 
the oppression of anti-Semitic Europe and the abounding—yet distant—opportunities of 
twentieth century America, Chelsea’s unassuming and industrial character allowed Jewish 
migrants to take small, but decisive steps towards socioeconomic ascent. For the Jews, Chelsea 
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was the “Jerusalem of America”; but ultimately, the momentum of modernity led the Jews out of 
Chelsea, and in search of “richer pastures” in the city and suburbs. 2   
 
The Mother of Exile 
 The mass arrival of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe began in the 1880s, just as the 
flow of Jewish immigrants from Germany was trailing off and right as industrialization in 
Chelsea took flight. Like their German brethren who had sailed to Boston a half a century earlier, 
the Jews of Russia and Eastern Europe left their homeland because of the poverty and religious 
intolerance of Europe. The anti-Semitism of Old World Europe was pervasive and debilitating—
incorporated as it was in both law and popular belief—and inhibited the socioeconomic mobility 
of Jewish communities. Affecting Jews in Germany, Eastern Europe, and Russia alike, anti-
Semitism and socioeconomic inertia impelled the Jews to leave Europe and to seek “the 
promised land” across the Atlantic in America.3
 The arrival of Russian Jews permanently changed the urban landscape of Jewish Boston. 
Whereas the period between 1840 and 1880 witnessed an influx of Jews from Germany, nearly 
every Jew who arrived between 1880 and 1918 came from Russia or Eastern Europe. As a direct 
result of the anti-Semitic policies enumerated by the Russian Czar Alexander III, tens of 
thousands of Jews left Russia. At odds with his predecessor, the liberal Czar Alexander II, 
Alexander III reversed the laws that had granted Jews civil rights under the previous 
administration. The May Laws of 1882 prevented Jews from selling or mortgaging land, owning 
or leasing property, and managing estates for others. The May Laws also prohibited Jews from 
attending Russian universities and professional schools. Institutional anti-Semitism imprisoned 
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Russian Jews in economic serfdom. They earned low wages, paid high taxes, and competed 
against other Jews for a meager livelihood. As Mary Antin, a Russian immigrant who settled in 
Chelsea, stated in her autobiography The Promised Land, “it was bewildering to hear how many 
kinds of duties and taxes we owed the Czar. We paid taxes on our houses, and taxes on the rents 
from the houses, taxes on our business, taxes on our profits. I am not sure whether there were 
taxes on our losses.” 4 For Jews, socioeconomic mobility in Russia was unfathomable and as a 
result they fled. Though the majority of Russian Jews who sailed for Boston settled in the 
developing city, thousands of Russian immigrants—like Antin and her family—came to 
Chelsea.5  
 The onset of Jewish emigration from Russia was contemporaneous with industrialization 
in Chelsea. Between 1890 and 1910 Chelsea underwent tremendous industrial growth. Whereas 
the production of oils, tarnishes, and paints had dominated the city’s economy during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, box factories, foundries, machine shops, and most of all, shoe 
factories, dominated the industrial landscape at the turn of the twentieth century. The largest of 
Chelsea’s shoe factories was the A.G. Walton & Company, which was founded in Lynn in 1899 
but moved to the corner of Chelsea’s Maple and Heard Streets in 1907. Arriving in the year prior 
to the Great Fire of 1908, A.G Walton & Company was unaffected by the devastating 
conflagration. By 1910, the firm reported that it employed over 1,800 persons and manufactured 
over 12,000 pairs of shoes daily. Other important companies that prospered during this period 
included the Standard Box Company and the Revere Rubber Company.  
 If Chelsea’s industrial expansion was unanticipated, the rapid growth of its Russian 
Jewish community was completely unprecedented. During the second half of the nineteenth 
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century, Irish immigrants flooded Boston and its environs and comprised the greatest segment of 
the city’s foreign-born. By 1875, Chelsea already had 2,009 Irish immigrants and the numbers 
were still growing.  Yet in the fifteen years before and after 1900, immigrants from Russia 
surpassed the Irish as Chelsea’s most populous group of foreign-born individuals. In 1885 there 
were just eleven Russian immigrants living in Chelsea but by 1915 there were over nine 
thousand.  
Population of foreign born residents in Chelsea, 1875-19156
 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 
Foreign Born 
Total 
4,511 6,581 10,056 13,883 19,297 
Irish 2,009 2,326 2,942 2,267 Not listed 
Russian 3* 11 1,042 3,769 9,217 
* Included people from Russia, Poland, and Finland 
Between 1885 and 1895, over a thousand Russians settled in Chelsea and in the span of another 
ten years they exceeded the number of Irish-born by another thousand persons. The arrival of 
Russian Jews drastically changed the composition of the city’s immigrants and dramatically 
altered the demographic landscape. Just seven years after the Great Fire of 1908 forced many 
Jews out of Chelsea, the Russian-Jewish population had not only recovered, but grown to 9,217 
persons. In 1915, Russians accounted for 47.7 percent of Chelsea’s immigrant population and 
moreover, housed the largest population of Russians living in Massachusetts outside of Boston. 7
 Located at the crossroads of metropolitan Boston and her waterways, Chelsea beckoned 
industry and immigrants to the city’s shores. The steam-powered Winnisimmet Ferry made 
transportation from Boston to Chelsea cheap, and the institution of fire codes in Boston’s North 
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End brought the shantytowns to Chelsea—the most accessible inner-urban city. The intersection 
between capital and labor flourished in Chelsea and hastened the city’s industrial and 
demographic growth. The change was gradual, noted Walter Merriam Pratt, but it was shocking 
nonetheless.  
 Old residents did not realize the number that were locating in the city. The water  front 
 properties were too valuable to lie idle, and large manufacturers secured them and 
 located their factories there. With them naturally came a poorer class, and every two that 
 came drove one old resident away.8
Over the course of just a few decades, the city had become one of the most densely populated 
areas in the country, and was the new home of a myriad of manufacturing and business 
enterprises. What had once been the playground of Boston’s Protestant elite, had become a bona 
fide industrial city with a distinctly Jewish character by the turn of the twentieth century.   
 In light of the tendency—especially among Germans—to shed their Jewish identity upon 
settling in the U.S., Chelsea’s Jewish community was particularly unique. The new immigrants 
from Russia and Eastern Europe identified with Judaism as both a religion and culture and 
moreover, many of the Jews who came to Chelsea spoke Yiddish and practiced Jewish 
Orthodoxy, a sect of Judaism based upon the strict interpretation and application of the laws 
canonized in the Torah. As Antin eloquently stated,  
 . . . harassed on every side, thwarted in every normal effort, pent up within narrow 
 limits, all but dehumanized, the Russian Jew fell back upon the only thing that never 
 failed him,--his hereditary faith in God. In the study of the Torah he found  balm for all 
 his wounds; the minute observance of traditional rites became the expression of his 
 spiritual cravings; and in a dream of a restoration to Palestine he forgot the world. 9  
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Isolated and persecuted, Chelsea’s new immigrants embraced Judaism as a way of life. Whereas 
Jews of the Reform movement believed in modernizing Jewish traditions and reforming Jewish 
law in ways that were compatible with American culture, Orthodox Jews maintained their old 
world religious traditions. By abstaining from work on Saturdays and abiding by the Jewish 
dietary laws, the earliest Jews of Chelsea observed Shabbat, the Saturday Sabbath, and Kashrut, 
the maintenance of a Kosher diet. 10
 That being said, Jewish employment in Chelsea reflected the demands of labor, the 
guidelines of Orthodox Judaism, and the signs of a community on the rise. A small sampling of 
the community from the city directory revealed the rough patterns of Jewish occupation. Of the 
fifty-six Cohens—one of the most common Jewish-American surnames—living in Chelsea in 
1906, the four most represented sectors of the economy were clothing, shoes, junk, and 
construction—in that order. Those involved in construction were laborers or masons, those in the 
junk business were either junk dealers or collectors, and those in the clothing and shoe industries 
held various posts. In fact, in both the shoe and clothing industries there was a spectrum of 
occupations not seen among the junk dealers or masons. Of those involved in shoe 
manufacturing, two were shoe factory operators, two were shoe repairers, and two were 
shoemakers; and likewise, of those in the clothing business, five were tailors, one was a dress 
cutter, and one was a clothing worker. For a relatively new immigrant population, the Jews had 
penetrated the city’s economy from a variety of angles and in a number of resourceful ways. 
Dealing recyclable materials and working in the city’s shoe industry were particularly 
advantageous occupations. Junk dealers capitalized on the waste created by industrialization, and 
shoe operators benefitted from the likelihood of ascension in an expanding industry. 11  
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 The Great Fire of 1908 threatened the industrial and demographic succession that had 
been underway for the past two decades. Chelsea was a tinderbox, and over two-fifths of the city 
went up in flames. Destroying eighteen city blocks, the fire leveled the industrial districts along 
Marginal and Williams Streets and the densely populated residential districts located slightly 
inland. Not to mention the junkyards had all but been destroyed and the Jewish enclaves by 
Arlington and Williams Streets burned to the ground. In many ways, the uncertainties that the 
fire created were more frightening than the conflagration itself. The city had to reconstruct the 
urban grid, and rebuild the socioeconomic hierarchies that were lost to the flames. In the 
aftermath of the fire nothing was guaranteed. Yet what did become increasingly clear was that 
Chelsea, for better or for worse, would never be the same.12
 
The Breadth of the Fire 
At 10:44 am on Monday April 12, 1908 an unidentified caller reported the genesis of a 
fire billowing from a pile of rags sitting in a vacant lot in the industrial district—located along 
the riverbed. Springing from the water, the fire was stoked by winds that reached 40 mph at noon 
and carried the burning heap of rags to the rooftop of the Boston Blacking Company, setting the 
building aflame. From mound to mound the high-powered winds pollinated the dry rags with 
ignited debris, and in a matter of minutes the small fire had exploded into a full-fledged 
industrial conflagration. The old housing stock used for rags and junk was the first to ignite, soon 
to be followed by the dwellings of the lower and middles classes.13
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As the fire blazed, the city erupted into commotion. Many people huddled in the Garden 
Cemetery, crouching low to the ground, while others ran to the northern marshlands in search of 
refuge. Walter Pratt’s account of the fire painted a portrait of utter chaos and terror. 
The wind blew with such force that women were blown into fences and trees or lost their 
balance and fell. Great pieces of furniture went bounding end over end down the hill, 
blown by the wind. Horses were running away, and the scene was one of terrifying 
confusion. Escape was possible only by enduring the hostile breath of flames, running, 
tripping over abandoned furniture in the blinding, sickening smoke. . . The wails of the 
frantic parents vainly searching for their children added to the excitement.14
The fire spread westward to Broadway, the thoroughfare connecting Chelsea to Boston, and 
quickly made its way eastward towards the Chelsea Street Bridge. The rapidly moving fire was 
out of control, and Chelsea was not adequately equipped to combat the flames. Firemen and fire 
equipment poured into Chelsea from throughout metro Boston. Dedham, Brookline, and Boston 
from the South along with Lynn, Saugus, and Revere from the North were just a few of the 
towns that battled the flames during the height of the blaze.15  
Throughout the night the militia restored the first semblances of order. Dispatched by 
acting Governor Ebenezer Draper at the request of Mayor John Beck, over twelve hundred men 
came to Chelsea to restrict movement in and out of the city. They formed a barrier around the 
burned area and inspected the city for hazardous zones. While the presence of the militia was a 
testament to the epic proportions of the fire, the duties of the soldiers also underscored the 
troubles yet to come. The primary objective of the militia—as decreed by Colonel E. Leroy 
Sweetster—was to protect private property and to restore order to a city rife with chaos. 16
The damage caused by the fire was cataclysmic: 492 acres burned, 1,822 buildings 
collapsed, and 17,450 people lost their homes. Along with eighteen miles of Chelsea’s streets, 
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the city hall, public library, YMCA, state armory, and the U.S. Post Office burned. The fire 
leveled nine schools and two hospitals, nine churches and three synagogues. Not to mention the 
fire had consumed residencies of all sorts including 1,781 wooden homes, 652 brick homes, and 
210 tenement houses. Real estate loss amounted to $12,450,000 and personal property loss to 
$20 million. In a matter of minutes, social and spatial barriers that had developed over the course 
of one-hundred years had crumbled into ash. Consuming everything from rag-shops to real estate 
offices, tenements to brick homes, the conflagration had laid waste to the city.  The Jewish 
quarter located between Arlington and Williams Streets had burned, and shortly thereafter the 
elite residential district of Bellingham Hill had followed suit, “hundreds were going the same 
way; poor and rich were on equal terms.” As day dawned upon Chelsea it became apparent that 
the fire had leveled Chelsea and spared none. Both the palatial mansions of the rich and the 
wooden shacks of the poor were among the masses of ruins that covered two-fifths of the city. 17
 
For a New and Better Chelsea 
 The process of reconstruction began with relief.  A total of eighteen thousand people 
were homeless. Days after the fire refugees filled the courthouse, local high schools, and a 
number of churches and synagogues. The most fortunate found refuge in adjoining cities and the 
least fortunate occupied one of seven-hundred tents sprawled throughout the city.   Heeding the 
call for food and shelter, a diverse assortment of organizations and people rose to the occasion. 
In addition to the five official relief stations operated by the Chelsea Relief Committee, over a 
dozen religious bodies, labor unions, and social clubs spearheaded independent efforts. Examples 
include the Central Congregational Church on Washington Avenue, the Hebrew Information 
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Bureau on Winnisimmet Street, and the Knights of Columbus on Park Street.  Though Walter 
Pratt noted that such organizations “looked out for their own people,” conflicting accounts of the 
relief effort suggested that the first battle between Jewish Chelsea and “Old Chelsea” was fought 
over the question of relief.18
 The Jewish residents of Chelsea suffered enormously in the immediate aftermath of the 
fire. As an immigrant neighborhood constantly living from hand to mouth, few of the tailors, 
grocers, junk dealers, and other small business owners had insurance to cover their losses. 
Recognizing the anguish of the city’s Jews, the Young Men’s Hebrew Association issued a 
distress call to Jacob de Hass and Max Mitchell, the presidents of Boston’s Greater Federation of 
Jewish Charities (GFJC). Immediately after receiving the call, the GFJC sent one thousand 
breakfasts to Chelsea’s homeless—regardless of denomination—and soon after opened quarters 
on Charles Street in Boston to house victims of the fire. Given that the fire had blazed on 
Passover, the GFJC also provided materials and venues for Jewish residents to celebrate the 
annual holiday. In addition to sending over ten thousand pounds of Matzos, the GFJC organized 
two Seder dinners at the YMHA and many more at synagogues in Boston.  Through the lens of 
the greater Boston Jewish community, the obliteration of Chelsea had reached Biblical 
proportions. Evoking religious imagery the Jewish Advocate noted that “for all the world it 
looked skyward like one of those old prints of the destruction of Jerusalem.” 19  
 That being said, who received Jewish charity became a source of conflict and accounts of 
the Jewish relief effort varied enormously. In an article published in the Chelsea Evening 
Record, the author noted that all but “the Hebrews” received aid from the official relief stations. 
Given that the GFJC was involved in the relief effort, this absence of Jews was not completely 
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surprising. Just as Pratt noted that the Catholics sought assistance at the old parochial residence, 
the Jews sought assistance from the YMHA and GFJC.  Yet according to De Haas, after 
distributing materials for Passover, the general relief committee forced Jewish social workers to 
comply with their relief efforts—and for all intensive purposes they did.  Jewish social, athletic, 
and educational organizations turned over proceeds to the general relief committee and staff 
members of the GFJC served as Yiddish translators on behalf of the relief effort.   But given that 
the GFJC was complying with the general relief effort, it was odd that the newspaper singled out 
the Jews as the only group of citizens not frequenting the official relief stations. Something was 
awry. 20
Though inconclusive, the terms of GFJC-provided charity highlighted underlying 
tensions between Chelsea’s Jewish character and the non-Jewish community.  The GFJC, of 
course, joined Chelsea’s relief effort on the grounds of religious solidarity. In light of the 
divisions in Boston’s Jewish community, De Haas—who was also the editor of the Jewish 
Advocate and the secretary of the Federation of American Zionists— and his colleagues were 
determined to wield philanthropy as a tool for promoting an all-inclusive Jewish identity. The 
devastating fire had provided the opportune moment. Yet in their noble attempt to forge bonds 
between Boston’s German Jews and Chelsea’s Russian Jews, the GFJC both encroached on the 
jurisdiction of the general relief committee and singled out the Jewish community as their 
“preferred” recipient. By pledging support in the name of Judaism, the GFJC’s overwhelming 
demonstration of relief must have been unsettling to a community that viewed Jewish 
empowerment as a threat to the preexisting social order or at the very least, considered the 
thought unpalatable.21
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As the question of relief gave way to that of recovery, the terms of reconstruction once 
again echoed underlying tensions between capital and labor, immigrants and natives.  In the days 
after the fire, residents voted in favor of a bill that placed Chelsea in the hands of a Board of 
Control. Once enacted, the legislation endowed the board with the power of Mayor, School 
Committee, and Board of Alderman and, moreover, provided each of the five members with 
salaries so as to ensure that the board acted in Chelsea’s “best interests.” The bill, however, was 
clearly the brainchild of the urban elite. As rich civic officials, business magnates, and 
entrepreneurs—indeed ex-Mayor Strahan of the Strahan Paper Company was all of the above— 
the attendees granted exceptional powers to an unelected, governing body for commercial and 
personal interests.  The Commission was neither subject to the ballot box nor responsible for 
advancing the interests of any one faction “to the detriment of the city,” as Walter Pratt put it.  
Though impartial rhetoric framed the municipal hearing, there was little doubt that many of the 
Jews were the “undesirable citizens” who inhabited the much despised “light and flimsy 
buildings” within the city. Yet public opinion aside, the Board of Control had no control over 
who benefitted from the policies they instated. The commission established city parks; widened 
city streets; regulated the height and material of newly constructed buildings; solicited $20,000 
from Andrew Carnegie to build a public library; rebuilt the Williams and Shurtleff schools; and 
most importantly, restored financial confidence in the city by promoting economic growth.22
 
 In the years following the conflagration, Chelsea was reborn as an industrial boomtown. 
Manufacturing enterprises of all sorts prospered in the aftermath of the fire and hastened the 
speed of industrialization. The Globe Shoe Company, Chelsea Shoe Manufacturing Company, 
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Standard Box Company, Bay State Improved Box Company, W.A. Snow Iron Works, Union 
Metal Works, and the Revere Rubber Company, were just a few of the dozens of industries that 
expanded or emerged in post-1908 Chelsea.  By 1922, the city’s industrial economy grossed over 
$30 million and employed approximately seven-thousand wage earners. The city’s top employers 
were the A & G Walton Company and the Revere Rubber Company, employing a thousand 
persons a piece, and the city’s fastest growing industries partook in the shoe and oil business. By 
1930, A & G Walton was one of the largest manufacturers of boys and girls shoes in the country, 
and with the arrival of Valvoline Oil, the Texas Oil Company, and the Mexican Petroleum 
Company, a new oil industry permanently furnished Chelsea’s waterfront.  23
 In the wake of industrialization, unfavorable public opinion towards Jews did not prevent 
the upward movement of the religious community. Though men such as Walter Pratt hoped to 
see reconstruction force the “Hebrew junk dealers” out of the city, the combined effect of 
demographic efflux and renewed industrialization encouraged the growth of the city’s Jewish 
population.  Many of Chelsea’s privileged residents left of their own accord. Without business 
ties to the city there was no reason to stay and, moreover, other towns had greener property and 
larger homes to offer. As for those residents who had made their living in Chelsea, a significant 
portion left as well. Fifty grocers, twenty-nine barbers, twenty-eight doctors, thirteen 
pharmacists, twenty-eight tailors, twenty-one real estate offices, and seventeen insurance offices 
lost their places of business to the fire. The ever-growing Jewish community benefitted 
tremendously from the flight of proprietors. Resourceful Jews opened small-businesses catering 
to the industrial economy and the religious community, and Jewish newcomers attracted to this 
thriving community replenished the supply of working class-labor. 24
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A sampling of Jewish professions from the city directories from 1906 and 1916 revealed 
that the Jews had not sustained irrevocable losses after the fire. In fact, the community grew. 
While many of the proprietors from 1906 were no longer listed, a new crop of Jewish 
entrepreneurs and laborers emerged during 1916. Even the much despised “Hebrew junk 
dealers” showed signs of prosperity. While the Plotinsky & Rubin had disappeared from Second 
Street altogether—the factory was in the fire area—Myer Sowsky still owned and operated his 
business on 276 Second Street. David Rosenthal moved from 171 Arlington to 79 Heard Street, 
and Harry Cohen on Second Street changed his business name to Cohn H. & Co.  Likewise, 
similar trends appeared amongst the meat, shoe, and rag markets. Hyman Baer and Joseph 
Levine, for instance, had abandoned their shoe businesses on Broadway and Winnisimmet, but 
companies such as the Katzman Brothers and the Kornetsky Brothers had taken their place by 
1916. While there were quite a few Jews still working as rag pickers, peddlers, and shoe factory 
laborers, the change over time suggested significant social mobility. Of the 112 Cohens living in 
Chelsea in 1916 (a two-hundred percent increase from 1906), there were six clerks, two lawyers, 
two insurance agents, and a reporter for the Chelsea Record.25
Riding on the wings of industrialization, the city’s Jewish population became the largest 
population of Jews living outside of New York. In 1915 Chelsea housed twelve Orthodox 
synagogues, fifteen congregations, a Young Men’s Hebrew Association, the United Chelsea 
Mother’s League of Massachusetts, the Chelsea Hebrew School, and a dozen other philanthropic 
and community organizations. Though still a working-class community, Chelsea’s religious 
neighborhood had gained the respect of its Jewish brethren and the attention of metropolitan 
Boston. When Louis Brandeis, the popular Jewish lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice, 
22 
 
visited Chelsea in 1915 he proclaimed that the small metropolis was “America’s Most Jewish 
City.”  
We have come here at your invitation, which has been so graciously presented to us. . . 
because, in the first place, there is this body of Jews in Chelsea who constitute as large a 
part of the population and who, by their conduct, have given to the Jewish name here and 
throughout the Commonwealth so good a reputation, and in the second place, because 
one of our greatest leaders [Jacob de Haas]. . . stated that nowhere had he found a more 
sympathetic and intelligent audience in America than in your city.26
From 1915 up until the decline of the Jewish community in the 1950s, Jewish Chelsea remained 
a salient coalition of Boston’s Jewry and a prosperous working-class community. The religious 
community that developed a Jewish Chelsea during the first two decades of the twentieth century 
laid the foundation for what became a dynamic working-class community. In the 1930s, there 
were approximately 20,000 Jews living in Chelsea and they comprised almost half of the 
population. By the 1950s Jewish food stores lined the streets, and Yiddish resounded throughout 
the city’s narrow alleyways. “Even if you weren’t Jewish, you were Jewish,” recalled Norman 
Finkelstein, a longtime resident of Chelsea. The Jews owned the stores and they owned real 
estate. On Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, and Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of 
Atonement, Chelsea’s public schools closed.27  
 
Leaving Chelsea 
 In 1930, Jewish Chelsea peaked at 20,000 persons, and from then onward the population 
began to decline. Owing to increased prosperity and social mobility, many of Chelsea’s Jews 
voluntarily settled in the emerging neighborhoods of Brookline and Brighton and more moved to 
the North Shore and settled in towns such as Swampscott and Marblehead. At a time when 
23 
 
housing costs were cheaper in the suburbs than in the city, thousands of Boston’s Jews moved in 
what was a sustained exodus to the suburbs. Socioeconomic mobility was limited for Jews in the 
“old neighborhoods” such as Chelsea. Many of Chelsea’s Jews had increased income by buying 
property, becoming landlords, and through opening small businesses. Take Louis Kaplan for 
example. As a 27 year-old man, Kaplan fled from Russia in 1905 and settled in Chelsea, 
speaking only Yiddish. He was the father of ten children; day in and day out he and his brood 
sorted rags for his rag-picking business. The clothing shortage that began during World War II 
was a turning point for Kaplan. The rag-picking business benefitted enormously from the war 
effort and in the aftermath, Kaplan and his brother began to invest their new wealth in property. 
Upon his death, he held property in five Greater Boston communities: Stoneham, Melrose, 
Roxbury, Wellesley, Peabody, and Lynn. His real estate assets totaled $1.5 million, while other 
assets, including bank accounts, securities, and bonds, amounted to another $1.5 million. 
Looking beyond the extraordinary wealth that Kaplan amassed, his narrative nonetheless detailed 
one of the many avenues that led the Jews out of Chelsea. None of his children resided in 
Chelsea and all but one had a professional career. 28
Though the diaspora of Jewish Chelsea is intimately tied to the greater experience of 
Jews in Boston, the history of Chelsea’s Jewry is distinct. As one of the original neighborhoods 
of immigrant settlement, Chelsea’s Jewish community was in constant flux. Home to thousands 
of poor immigrant families and a thriving network of Jewish institutions, Chelsea was a point of 
origin for Jewish migration and movement throughout the greater Boston area. Yet as the second 
generation of Eastern European and Russian Jews heeded the call of assimilation and modernity, 
Chelsea’s Jewish residents left the tenements and religiosity of their hometown in search of new 
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opportunities. In fact, though Antin affectionately described her year spent in Chelsea, she 
nonetheless noted that Chelsea was “the proper locality for a man without capital to do 
business.” Though formative in her pursuit of English and her efforts to acquire an “American” 
identity, Chelsea was not the final destination on her journey from Polotzk.  After just a year of 
living in Chelsea, Antin and her family moved to Boston, “so went the life in Chelsea for the 
space of a year or so. Then my father, finding a discrepancy between his assets and liabilities on 
the wrong side of the ledger, once more struck tent, collected his flock, and set out in search of 
richer pastures.”  29
Antin’s brief sojourn in Chelsea was, in many ways, the paradigm of the Jewish 
immigrant experience in Chelsea. As a small, industrial city located on the “wrong side” of the 
Mystic River, Chelsea offered limited socioeconomic mobility. With pull factors such as 
suburbia and push factors such as an inner-urban environment and a lack of single family homes, 
much of Jewish Chelsea moved out as they rose into the middle class during the thirties and 
forties. Although many Jews kept their small businesses and property in Chelsea, they no longer 
resided in the city itself. Jewish Chelsea may have been the “Jerusalem of America” but as the 
generation of American-born youth came of age during the 50s and 60s, they left for good. As 
Norman Finkelstein plainly put it, “the idea was we love Chelsea, but the dream was to get out of 
Chelsea. And that is exactly what happened.” 30
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Chapter Two:   
 
Out of the Flames, Under the Bridge: Emerging Urban Crisis and the Genesis of Chelsea’s 
Latino Community, 1950-1973 
 
The city was economically dead, contracting, beaten down by years of neglect and out migration 
of its first families and major businesses. 1
          The Chelsea Record 
 
 
Continued industrial activity and demographic decline provided the foundation for the 
growth of the Latino community in Chelsea. The need for factory workers accelerated Latino 
population growth and the loss of both native-born workers and residents promoted Latino 
settlement. The population decline between 1950 and 1970 was the key to Latino growth before 
1973. In twenty years the general population fell from 38,912 to 30,625, and during the interim 
the Latino population expanded to over a thousand. Urban crisis had Chelsea in its grip—and at 
its mercy—long before the Latino population rose to prominence during the 1970s. The rise of 
suburbia and federal disinvestment left Chelsea in the exhaust of post-World War II prosperity, 
and the construction of the Mystic River Bridge stripped the city of both its property and dignity 
in a debilitating one-two punch. After the Second World War, federal policy and state 
infrastructure prioritized the needs of returning veterans and encouraged suburban growth, and it 
was those decisions—not poor people—that drove Chelsea into the ground. From 1950 onwards, 
Chelsea suffered from chronic urban failure that worsened each decade as existing problems 
remained unaddressed and as new ones emerged. 2  
The financial assistance available after the Second World War contributed to the city’s 
first boom in federal and state housing.  Although many cities had created housing authorities 
during the late 1930s as a result of New Deal policies, Chelsea inaugurated its housing authority 
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in 1946. The Chelsea Housing Authority was the vehicle through which housing advocates, 
receptive government executives, and legislators procured state and federal funding. The 
authority completed applications, solicited contractors, supervised construction, and eventually 
chose tenants that met the eligibility requirements set forth by the state and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In Chelsea, all but one of the six housing 
developments built during the post-World War II period were for returning veterans. The four 
state-subsidized projects were the Fitzpatrick, Prattville, Innes, and Union Park Apartments, and 
the two federally subsidized projects were the Scrivano and Mace Apartments. The Fitzpatrick, 
Prattville, Innes, Scrivano, and Mace projects were family developments of predominantly two 
and three-bedroom apartments, though there were a limited number of four and one-bedroom 
arrangements. The Union Park Apartments, on the other hand, was a development for the elderly 
and/or disabled. With the exception of the Innes Apartments, each of the five developments was 
located at the city’s northernmost boundaries—by either Everett or Revere. Three were located 
along the Revere Beach Parkway, and the elderly development was located in the Jewish 
neighborhood surrounding the Orange Street Synagogue. The Innes Apartments resided on the 
eastern end of Chelsea by the bridge to East Boston.  The construction of these state and federal 
subsidized developments had little—if any—effect on the densely populated and poorly 
constructed neighborhoods that congregated around Bellingham Square.  Not only were the 
developments located on the city limits, they were reserved for a specific demographic that did 
not equally encompass all of the city’s residents. 3
In consideration of the greater context of federal policy and financial stimuli during the 
post-World War II period, Chelsea fared poorly in the market for government assistance. The 
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state and federal funds that Chelsea received did not stimulate the urban economy in the same 
way that postwar programs fueled the growth of the suburbs and, moreover, such financial 
support paled in comparison to the money pouring into suburban areas. Federal incentives not 
only overlooked small cities but favored the growth of suburbia. Federal programs encouraged 
the construction of new homes and not the renovation of existing homes, and provided credit 
opportunities for citizens to become homeowners and not renters. Under the G.I. Bill, the federal 
government guaranteed mortgages and lending services to veterans, and as a result an increasing 
number of middle and working-class families settled in the suburbs. Inner-urban cities like 
Chelsea faded into the background as urban dwellers moved across Metro Boston. Without the 
space to construct single-family homes or the financial incentives to build them, Chelsea suffered 
as veterans —and the government assistance that supported them—moved out of the city and 
into the suburbs.4  
By 1950 it was already apparent that Chelsea lagged behind the prosperity that was 
evident across many parts of the nation. In January of 1950, the Chelsea Record published a 
platform that prioritized what the newspaper believed to be the most pressing issues inhibiting 
future growth. The platform called for efficient economical city government; comprehensive 
rehabilitation for veterans; improved rapid transit service; full retail and industrial development; 
adequate parking facilities in business areas; lower automobile insurance rates; and a cleaner 
Chelsea. Change, however, never came easy to Chelsea, and from 1950 to 1973 the platform of 
the Chelsea Record remained exactly the same. Over a twenty-three year period, the grim 
prognosis of Chelsea’s future continued to define its present. Though industry quietly hummed 
throughout the fifties and sixties, urban disinvestment; the devastating effects of the Mystic 
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River Bridge; and the battle between industrial and residential Chelsea, primed the city for a 
deepening urban crisis. 5
 
The Real Green Monster 
 
In 1946, the Massachusetts State Legislature approved plans to build a bridge that 
facilitated the flow of traffic across the Mystic River. The bridge was the keystone of an express-
highway network connecting Boston and its environs. Urban accessibility was integral to 
suburbanization and as Boston’s suburbs grew so, too, did the need for more efficient 
transportation.  The Mystic River Bridge was a watershed because it relieved congestion 
throughout the city and consolidated a handful of major thoroughfares. Yet what was a 
breakthrough for Boston was a breaking point for Chelsea. The decision to build a bridge 
through the city had far-reaching consequences. Already suffering from urban disinvestment and 
the accession of suburbia, the bridge cast a shadow over the city and physically devastated the 
urban environment. The bridge bisected Chelsea and flattened significant portions of the densely 
inhabited city in order to make room for approaches and ramps. For Boston, the bridge was a 
harbinger of prosperity, but for Chelsea, the superstructure was an omen of decline. Postwar 
suburbanization compelled the reorganization of Boston’s transportation system to Chelsea’s 
disadvantage. Before construction of the bridge, all traffic between Boston and the North Shore 
depended upon the Chelsea North Bridge: a drawbridge that connected Chelsea Street of 
Charlestown with Broadway of Chelsea. Though the drawbridge often caused delays and traffic 
jams—due to its frequent openings (approximately 7,000 per year)—local businesses benefited 
from the daily flow of people. During the first half of the century, Chelsea was the gateway to 
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Boston, but in 1950—when the structure began operations—the route of the bridge stripped that 
title away. 6
Cutting through the heart of Chelsea, the Mystic River Bridge marked the beginning of 
the end of “Old Chelsea,” which during the second half of the century referred to the city’s 
white-ethnic inhabitants. Mike Szpuk, a resident of Saugus who grew up on Arlington Street, 
noted that Chelsea residents began migrating soon after the building commission broke ground. 
The assembly of the bridge affected hundreds of people. Seventy homes in Ward One were 
relocated to Gilooly Road and Webster Avenue, and those homes that were not in any condition 
to be transplanted were torn down. The bridge also displaced 462 families. At the time, the city 
was experiencing the greatest housing shortage it had ever known, and yet neither the state nor 
the federal government provided funds to aid the erection of new houses. The bridge commission 
reimbursed the city with $200,000 dollars to cover the cost of relocating homes, but offered no 
compensation for the taxable property lost. In one fell swoop the city lost $13 million worth of 
taxable property, which was a cost it could not afford. In addition, the birth of the bridge also 
posed serious risks to the residents of the Williams School district. The Williams School district 
(now the Walnut Street School district) was a working-class neighborhood that served the most 
ethnically diverse community in Chelsea. The district was once the home of Mary Antin, who 
once described Arlington Street as being “inhabited by poor Jews, poor Negroes, and a 
sprinkling of poor Irish.”  Upon construction, traffic approaches buried the district and 
endangered children walking to and from school. The first exit ramp off the bridge unloaded 
traffic a few blocks away from the school and moreover, the bridge itself permanently isolated 
the Williams School District from Broadway—the center of town. 7
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In an attempt to halt the reorganization of their city and their lives, Chelsea’s residents 
participated in public hearings, protests, and visits to the State House and to Washington D.C.  
Most notably, in July of 1948 an irate group of residents from Poplar Street stormed the 
aldermanic chambers of Mayor Tom Keating. The act was a desperate protest against being 
evicted from their homes in September of that same year. Irving Kahan, a grocer, led the group 
of Poplar residents and spoke on behalf of everyone when he interrogated the mayor about what 
the city planned to do “when the people are forced into the streets.” Pressed to address the 
infuriated crowd, the Board Alderman-at-large, Joseph B. Greenfield, spoke to the protestors and 
appeased them by offering a three-point plan describing how to stop or—at the very least—
postpone eviction. Though city hall was virtually powerless to petition the state authorities, 
Greenfield nonetheless agreed that the taking of homes was “outrageous, inhumane, and un-
American.”   Protesting the location of the approaches was yet another way that the community 
voiced their opposition to the bridge. In a “letter to the editor” of the Boston Globe, Charles 
Smith Jr., a resident at 72 Sagamore Avenue, expressed his fear that the approaches leading to 
and from the bridge would continue to afflict the city for years to come. For Smith, it was 
imperative to the integrity of the city to protest the routes of the “tentacles” that stretched into 
their community:  “will we protest the route, or location, of the new approaches? And will the 
protest accomplish anything. When will we protest? Now? Or will we wait until it is too late to 
do anything and then cry ‘we’ve been fooled again?’” Fortunately, the activism of residents like 
Smith successfully exerted some influence over the course of the overpass. Before breaking 
ground, the bridge commission agreed to cut the width of the structure in half—through adopting 
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a double-deck design—and after construction finished the bridge commission, in response to 
popular demand, actively abstained from building new approaches.8
Yet in the face of eminent domain, the pragmatism of residents like Smith took on a 
Panglossian character. The location of the approaches did not change the fact that the bridge 
permanently blemished the physical and economic wellbeing of the city. Rife with indignation, 
an editorial in the Chelsea Record likened Chelsea’s predicament to a small child left alone in 
the middle of a busy street. Caught in the midst of traffic and immobilized by “state interests,” 
Chelsea was as vulnerable and marooned as a forsaken child. The city and residents of Chelsea 
disproportionately bore the burden of a multi-million dollar structure that served the needs of 
suburbia and not small, urban centers like Chelsea. The bridge offered no short or long-term 
benefits for the city and moreover, buried it in a grave that it would occupy for the half century 
to follow. Nadine Mironchuck, the chairwoman of the Chelsea Historical Society, blamed the 
bridge for devastating her community. Her mother’s home on Poplar Street was one of the homes 
relocated to Webster Avenue. The state authorities, Mironchuck noted, foisted the bridge onto 
her community at a time “before people ever had comprehension they could fight city hall.”   
Devastated by property loss, disfigured by residential displacement, and depreciated by a three-
span cantilever truss and thirty-six northbound traffic approaches, Chelsea emerged from the 
Mystic River Bridge debacle with many, many scars. 9
The official dedication of the bridge took place on February 25, 1950. Governor Paul A. 
Dever and Mayor John Hynes presided over the ceremony, and hundreds braved the bitter cold to 
participate in the highly anticipated dedication. In an editorial entitled “The Big Event,” the 
editors of the Chelsea Record noted their excitement in regards to the completion of the bridge. 
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Though originally opposed to the project, the Chelsea Record adopted a new position that 
accepted the bridge as the herald of a “new Chelsea.” The newspaper commended the event as an 
“instrument of change” and in an editorial it likened the opening of the bridge to “the fateful 
Sunday in April of 1908, when fire swept away practically all of this city.” Indeed, the Chelsea 
Record was not alone in its decision to amend its perspective of what the future had in store. In 
the days leading up to official dedication, optimism encouraged residents to believe that the 
opening of the Mystic River Bridge would increase retail trade and allow the city to share in the 
sense of progress and prosperity that permeated the country. The day the bridge was dedicated, 
twenty-five vintage automobiles—dating back to 1911—crossed over the Mystic River in a 
“Progress of Transportation” motorcade. The bridge linked Boston with the North Shore, and the 
Chelsea Record felt proud to be located on one end of one of the greatest bridges of its type in 
America. “Whether one believed that the advent of the Mystic River Bridge is for the best or is 
for the worst, insofar as Chelsea is concerned there is no doubting that it has and will bring about 
the greatest changes in the community since the disastrous fire of 1908.” By comparing the Great 
Fire of 1908 to the inauguration of the Mystic River Bridge, the editorial emphasized the need 
for change and improvement in—what the editorial board believed to be—a stagnant 
community. Keeping abroad with the times was essential to the economic wellbeing of Chelsea, 
and given that the fire encouraged further industrialization, the article suggested the possibility 
that the bridge would encourage modernization. Unfortunately, those who believed that the 
“green monster” was for the worst spoke the last word. In the decades to follow, the bridge came 
to be universally despised by many—if not all—of Chelsea’s residents. In spite of the 
technological developments and rhetoric of “progress” associated with the bridge, the $27 
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million dollar project was three giant steps ahead of the small city. Overwhelmed by high taxes, 
stunted by urban disinvestment, and in the midst of a housing shortage, Chelsea was the victim 
and not the beneficiary of the “motorcade of progress.” In the end, the promise of a “new 
Chelsea” was no more than political lip service and at the very least, a good way to sell 
newspapers. 10
 
Chelsea. . . a City of Industry 
 
  As a small city of 1.8 miles, Chelsea always had a limited tax base, but from 1950 
onward Chelsea suffered at the hand of exorbitantly high tax rates. In addition to the taxable 
property lost during the construction of the bridge, many non-profit, charitable, religious, and 
government institutions were exempt from paying taxes. In 1950, over 19.6 percent of the city’s 
tax base was exempt. The renters, small business owners, and other property holders thus 
disproportionately bore the burden of government spending and services provided to the entire 
town. And to add insult to injury, industrial property holdings located along the edge of town, 
though not exempt, enjoyed generous corporate tax breaks that overlooked the everyday 
citizen.11
By 1950 Chelsea already demonstrated a pro-corporate bias that disfavored residents. 
One example of such pro-corporate leanings among local municipal leaders was Mayor Thomas 
Keating (1948-1949). Born and raised in Chelsea, Mayor Keating was engaged in the fuel oil 
business in all parts of the city. Though his mayoral career was short, Keating served on the 
Board of Alderman from 1939 to 1948, which meant he had a substantial political career. Given 
that Keating occupied a powerful municipal position during a decade that witnessed 
unprecedented government spending and unparalleled manufacturing productivity, his ties to the 
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oil industry more likely than not influenced the expansion of the oil industry. Not to mention 
Keating was a man who lived well above the means of the average Chelsea resident. With a 
home on 28 Harvard Street, in an area located at the northernmost part of Chelsea between 
Everett and Revere, Keating lived in a quasi-suburban locale that had nothing in common with 
the three-decker homes and housing projects located along Arlington Street. Safe to say, as a 
resident of Harvard Street, Keating was never in harms way of conflagration nor subject to the 
eyesore of oil refineries.12  
With or without a deliberate pro-corporate bias, industry was nonetheless woven into the 
very fabric of the city.  As an urban satellite and a gateway to Boston, both the city’s identity and 
integrity depended upon the presence of industry. In a true demonstration of the asymmetrical 
relationship between Chelsea and industry, from January 10 to January 25 of 1955, the city 
hosted an industrial exposition entitled Chelsea . . . “City of Industries.”  Taking a page out of 
the World’s Fair handbook, the Chelsea Chamber of Commerce organized the exposition with 
the two-fold intent that it would launch Chelsea’s new Industrial Development Program and 
“educate” residents about the industrial foundations of Chelsea’s economy.  The Chamber of 
Commerce invited a myriad of local industries to the event, and all who accepted exhibited their 
products in miniature pavilions at the Chelsea State Armory.  The exhibitors and co-sponsors of 
the event included the American Biltrite Rubber, American Oil, Chelsea Chevrolet, Suffolk 
Farms Packing, Sweetheart Paper Products, Chelsea Clock, and the United Farms of New 
England—the most prominent names in Chelsea at the time.  The Chelsea Record praised the 
exposition as an integral part of continuing the city’s tradition of attracting and welcoming 
industry within the city limits. “This big time presentation of Chelsea’s advantages and some of 
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its important industries for all to see, is the first step in a program of wider scope to sell the city 
as a desirable spot for new industry.” In light of urban disinvestment and the recent construction 
of the Mystic River Bridge, Chelsea’s warm reception of the exposition—and the aims of the 
Industrial Development Program—was particularly tragic. Conflating industrial development 
with progress, Chelsea failed to address the needs of a changing urban milieu. Housing stock was 
aging, taxes rising, and vehicles zoomed overhead. Yet instead of facing this new crop of urban 
problems, Chelsea welcomed industrial development as an urban elixir. 13
Though the first signs of urban crisis emerged during the fifties, it was not until the 
sixties that urban crisis became a tangible threat. Fearing the onset of financial decline, any 
evidence of growth in the city’s business sector garnered front-page news. In 1960, an analytical 
survey conducted by the Chamber of Commerce issued a report defending the integrity of 
Chelsea’s industrial sector. The report assured city residents that “Chelsea is not going to 
pieces,” that “businesses of all kinds are not in a slump in Chelsea,” and that “there are a great 
many advantages to be found here.” Just ten years after the industrial exposition, the Chamber of 
Commerce no longer promoted industrial growth but defended the existence of growth at all. 
Clearly, the efforts of the Industrial Development Program were not bearing fruit. The decline in 
public confidence confirmed the shortcomings of the city’s open-door policy towards industry. 
Changing public opinion, however, did not release the city from its industrial contract. In early 
1960, the town approved plans to build a handful of oil tanks by the waterfront that had the 
capacity to hold 965,000 gallons of petroleum. Though three aldermen vehemently opposed the 
construction on the grounds that the tanks endangered the public health and ensured higher 
insurance rates for the city, the Board of Alderman granted the oil companies approval. 14
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By 1965, the deterioration of residential properties had reached alarming proportions. 
The municipal expediency that characterized the allocation of permits and the construction of oil 
tanks, was all but absent from the ongoing discussion regarding the revitalization of housing 
stock. Decrepit housing threatened the health of both Chelsea and her residents. According to the 
city engineer, substandard structural problems afflicted between ten and fifteen percent of the 
city’s residences. Given that dilapidated housing caused unseen health damages and devalued 
nearby residencies, part of the agenda of the newly elected mayor, Alfred R. Voke, was a 
rezoning project intended to renovate a number of blighted residential areas. Board Alderman 
Zazula joined Voke in his campaign for residential renewal and actively criticized landlords for 
failing to initiate repairs. Ultimately, however, the efforts of men like Voke and Zazula went 
nowhere. Though building inspectors had deemed sixty-four buildings unsuitable for habitation, 
tenants continued to occupy them and landlords continued to forego repairs. 15
Yet to say that urban crisis was the defining characteristic of Chelsea during this time 
would be to paint an inaccurate picture of the city’s everyday life. More industry also meant 
more employment. At the same time that city authorities were busy grappling with the budget 
and property devaluation, large portions of Chelsea were gainfully employed. In fact, 
unemployment decreased between 1960 and 1970—from 5.3 to 3.8 percent. Although increased 
industrial development endangered Chelsea’s long term health—both fiscally and physically—it 
nevertheless provided much needed employment opportunities. Isildro Vega, a Puerto Rican and 
lifelong resident of Chelsea, was one of the many Latinos who benefited from industrial 
employment. Arriving in 1965 as a young man of seventeen, Isildro moved into a single room 
located on Beacon Street. He lived side by side with an American family and found a job 
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working for a company that made paper. Though Isildro did not make a lot of money, he noted 
that factories “paid well” and that he was content with the wages he received. His income was 
sufficient to support his low cost of living and he worked a steady job. “There was a great need 
for workers,” Isildro explained, and industry employed everyone and anyone looking for 
employment. The demand for workers meant that many had the opportunity to choose between 
jobs, and as a result men like Isildro had the option of upgrading to better homes and jobs in 
other parts of the city as their savings accumulated.  16
In fact, after successfully soliciting a better paying job at a factory that picked and killed 
chickens—and the occasional turkey around Thanksgiving—Isildro moved from the room he 
rented on Beacon Street, which runs east to west directly below the Mystic River Bridge, to 
Shurtleff Street, which was located near a grammar school and in a better neighborhood. When 
asked to what extent the city’s housing shortage affected his first few years, Isildro responded 
from experience and on behalf of his fellow Latinos that “we bought where we could.” Not 
surprisingly, as a newly arrived immigrant who did not speak English, the daily admonitions of 
urban decay that splashed the newspaper headlines and filled the vestibules of Jewish 
synagogues did not reach Isildro’s ears. In decline or not, Chelsea offered him possibilities that 
he did not have in Puerto Rico. There was employment and housing—no matter how 
inadequate—to be had in Chelsea and as a result, he stayed. 17
Yet as the sixties came to a close, the dangers of urban decline were more present than 
ever—even for immigrants like Isildro. If the less than desirable state of housing and taxes were 
invisible signs of growing crisis, than the Gulf Oil Fire of 1969 was a harbinger of urban 
catastrophe.  As one of the first events of the new year, the Gulf Oil Fire sounded the alarm 
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concerning Chelsea’s injurious relationship with industry—and the oil industry in particular. On 
the third of January, a fire began at the loading docks of the Gulf Oil Company, where two oil 
tankers had been receiving fuel. One of the tanks backfired and ignited gasoline that had spilled 
along the dock. A booming explosion, heard by Suffolk County residents as far away as Quincy, 
signaled the beginning of the fire. Subsequent explosions continued to feed the flames and 
strengthen the raging inferno. Firefighters and city officials made frantic distress calls to nearby 
communities out of fear that the fire might spread to other oil refineries located along Eastern 
Avenue. Meanwhile, nearby residents and employees of the M & M Transportation Company 
and Ace Building Supply evacuated the area in anticipation of yet another industrial 
conflagration. Firefighters from Everett, Malden, Boston, Saugus, Lynn, Newton, Somerville, 
and Quincy, among others, responded to Chelsea’s desperate call for aid. The crews managed to 
successfully arrest the fire and limit its breadth to the property of the Gulf Oil Company. The two 
employees operating the Gulf Company machinery were badly injured, and four firefighters were 
harmfully burned. 18
The following day, city officials called and adjourned for a special meeting in response to 
the fire. Representatives from the various oil companies attended and met with city officials at 
the office of John J. Slater, Chelsea’s mayor. At the meeting, the Board of Alderman, along with 
police and fire staff, appealed to the oil companies to provide the community with a foam truck, 
which would be able to protect Chelsea’s residents in case of fire. Chelsea’s fire department did 
not have the foam equipment or the funds to buy what was necessary to combat fires as large as 
the one that erupted on the Gulf Oil dock. Had Logan airport not sent their foam equipment, the 
officials noted, the fire would have spread across the city waterfront. Though the oil company 
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representatives respectfully received the town’s request, Chelsea had no authority to demand 
anything from the companies. “The oil officials indicated interest in the proposal,” the Chelsea 
Record reported, “and told the city leaders that they would present it to their respective 
companies for their consideration and possible approval.” One of the Alderman, Joseph 
Margolis, even went so far as to assert that Chelsea had the “moral right” to demand such 
precautionary measures from the oil companies. Yet the fact that morality was invoked as a 
device to demand safety measures was a telling indication that the city’s relationship with 
industry had soured. Driven by profit, Chelsea’s oil industry capitalized on the city’s location 
without regard for the wellbeing of the community. Though the Gulf Oil Fire was only one of 
many fires that blazed between the fires of 1908 and 1973, the significance of the Gulf Oil Fire 
was of great consequence. Sixty-one years after the conflagration of 1908, Chelsea and its 
residents were still secondary citizens in a city dominated by industry. 19
  During the same week as the Gulf Oil Fire, Mayor Slater, in his mid-term address, 
delivered a grim—but honest—picture of the city’s future for the upcoming year, “unless the 
Commonwealth produces a realistic tax plan to redistribute the cost of government so that it is 
placed upon those best able to bear it, and distributes state aid on a formula based on need, our 
financial future is weak.”  The mayor noted that the city could not support itself solely on the 
revenue collected from local real-estate taxes. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts had 
promised a sales tax to decrease the financial burden on the taxpayers and renters of small cities, 
but in the end a distribution formula was adopted and therefore, did nothing to stimulate the 
economy of cities such as Chelsea. To add insult to injury, that same term, the Commonwealth 
also decided to finance the welfare deficit with local funds, thus plunging Chelsea deeper into 
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debt. “A city can only be as great as its people and a people can only be as great as their 
environment,” remarked Mayor Slater. And indeed, looking at the environment in which the 
people of Chelsea resided, the future was devastatingly bleak. According to the mayor, Chelsea’s 
most desperate need was decent and safe housing for all its citizens, but without the assistance of 
private developers or the state or federal government, the city ’s hands were tied: “we must do all 
we can to encourage and assist private developers to build standard low and moderate rental 
housing to meet the need of our citizens.” As a new decade approached Chelsea was faced with a 
catch-22. The only way to increase the tax base was through attracting industrial and commercial 
development and yet, the growth of oil and other industries only served to further endanger the 
city and its constituents. 20
 
From Jerusalem to San Juan, changing immigrant identity 
The Census of 1970 was very telling of the sudden emergence of Chelsea’s Latino 
population. Whereas there was no clear precedent of Latino migration in the censuses 1950 and 
1960, the figures of the 1970 census made it clear that Latinos had become the city’s dominant 
migrant group. According to the 1970 census, 1,618 individuals identified themselves as being of 
Hispanic descent and 1,098 of those individuals were Spanish-speakers. At 719 persons, first and 
second-generation Puerto Ricans comprised the majority of the Latino population, and with 120 
Cubans and 102 people from the “Americas,” other nationalities comprised sizeable minorities. 
Considering that the two preceding censes demonstrated minimal Latino residency, the figures 
revealed by the 1970 census were a cultural watershed. Chelsea’s demographic landscape had 
changed dramatically, and all roads pointed to San Juan.  21
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Although Chelsea’s Latino population emerged during the fifties and sixties, it was not 
until the seventies that Latinos became the principal—and most visible—group of immigrants in 
Chelsea. From 1950 to 1973 Jewish Chelsea was still very much alive. News of Jewish 
marriages, Bar Mitzvahs, and social events frequented the pages of the Chelsea Record, and only 
the sporadic advertisement printed in Spanish even alluded to the presence of a Hispanic 
community. Articles such as “Elm Street Synagogue groups dedicate Hebrew Menorah” and 
“Medford Rabbi Addresses Hebrew School Auxiliary” made headlines and Jewish names 
punctuated the daily text. Ironically, however, the Jews of Chelsea made headlines only as their 
population was in decline. Though Chelsea still bore the vestiges of a once vibrant Jewish 
community, Jewish Chelsea had long been in the process of diffusing into the Greater Boston 
area. 22
The persistence of Jewish identity during this period was more a product of propriety 
than demography. The Latino community celebrated Jewish holidays because they had Jewish 
bosses and they ate Jewish food because they dined at Jewish restaurants. Entrepreneurship and 
business ventures had made Jews wealthy and indeed, as Isildro put it, “Jews were the ones with 
the money.”  That being said, Isildro affirmed that the Jews of Chelsea were generous and 
hospitable proprietors. They gave the Latinos jobs and opportunities, and one of Isildro’s bosses 
even lent him money to pay for the passage of his father-in-law and mother-in-law from Puerto 
Rico to Chelsea.  Propriety aside, the Chelsea that launched Louis Kaplan, the Jewish rag picker, 
into the millionaires club was entirely different than the Chelsea that welcomed the first wave of 
Spanish-speaking immigrants. Latino immigrants had less of an opportunity to penetrate the 
skilled labor force than did their European counterparts. Arriving during the second half of the 
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twentieth century, Latinos operated within a different economic structure. The industry that 
sustained the growth and livelihood of earlier European immigrants no longer boomed. During 
the second half of the twentieth century, Boston was beginning to transition from an industrial to 
a service economy, and Chelsea, along with many other small, industrial towns, suffered as they 
failed to follow suit. 23
For the past two centuries, Boston had been a port of arrival for immigrants. Though not 
always welcoming, Boston’s urban manufacturing and commercial base provided jobs for the 
city’s newcomers, thus attracting large numbers of Latino migrants. In 1960, Boston’s Latino 
population had reached 2,000 strong, and by 1970 it had surged to 17,984. The Hart-Cellar Act 
of 1965—also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act—changed the face of American 
immigration policy. Abolishing the national origins quota system that had been active since the 
1920s, the Hart-Cellar Act prioritized immigrants based on their skills and family relationships 
with U.S. citizens. Though the act was not as important for Latinos from the western hemisphere 
the legislation was, nonetheless, a watershed for American immigration policy. Puerto Ricans 
were the main contributors of Boston’s Latino growth and accounted for approximately seventy 
percent of all local Latinos. After World War II, Puerto Ricans had begun a massive migration to 
the mainland in search of employment, and a significant number came to Boston. The Puerto 
Rican government encouraged migration to the mainland and moreover, Massachusetts 
employers recruited Puerto Ricans for both agricultural and industrial work. As early as the 
1940s, the Migration Division of the Department of Labor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
and the Massachusetts Department of Employment Security agreed to mutually support the 
recruitment of Puerto Ricans to Massachusetts as farm workers. As the second generation of 
44 
 
European immigrants and African Americans began to seek employment in the service and 
skilled sectors, there emerged a need for a new, inexpensive source of labor. Both formal and 
informal recruiting practices, ranging from company recruitment on the island to oral recruitment 
via community leaders, brought Puerto Ricans to Greater Boston to replace the jobs that white-
ethnics and African-Americans had abandoned. 24
In the early sixties and seventies, small numbers of Central American immigrants also 
settled in the Boston area, but most were affluent students and professionals who came in search 
of white-collar work. Central Americans from the lower classes found domestic work in 
suburban households and as low-paid employees in other sectors of the city. Boston’s Central 
American population would not boom until the eighties. Widespread chain migration began with 
the Puerto Ricans and it was the constant influx of people from the island that drove the growth 
of Boston’s Latino population. Puerto Ricans arrived with their nuclear and extended families, 
and encouraged their neighbors to do the same.25
Cuban immigrants composed another portion of Boston’s Latino migrations during this 
period.  The majority of Cubans in Boston were exiles who had fled during and after the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959. Whereas the first wave of Cuban immigrants carried wealthier refugees to 
the US, the second wave included more than 200,000 persons from the lower and working 
classes. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the Cuban Refugee Program, which was 
a federally funded program that sponsored the resettlement of Cuban refugees in the states. 
Under the auspices of the program, the U.S. sponsored a mass departure of Cubans from the 
island between 1963 and 1968. The program paid for transportation costs from Cuba to the U.S.; 
paid for settlement costs for Cubans settling outside of Miami; subsidized institutions and 
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agencies that provided services for the refugees; and provided medical, financial, and employee 
benefits to Cuban refugees. Seventy-two percent of Cuban exiles registered with the Cuban 
Refugee Program and cumulatively, they received $957 million in support. No other faction of 
Latino migrants received as much federal support as did the early waves of Cuban immigrants. 
By the early seventies, Cubans composed approximately one quarter of Boston’s Latino 
population. However, unlike the Puerto Rican population, the Cuban population in Boston was 
not self-sustaining, given that many relocated to Miami during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century.26
The migratory, settlement, and employment patterns that characterized Boston during the 
second half of the twentieth century were also true of Chelsea.  The early seventies witnessed the 
beginnings of Chelsea’s Central American population; the short-term demographic growth of the 
Cuban population; and the maturation of the Puerto Rican population and their kinship networks. 
While most Latinos in Chelsea were Puerto Ricans, Isildro noted that he had many Cuban friends 
in Chelsea before they moved to Miami and other parts of the country. They left, he said, 
“because they liked to own businesses and eat fish,” whereas the Puerto Ricans came to work. As 
for those from South and Central America, Isildro recalled that there were a few families from 
Costa Rica and Colombia, but not many. 27
Chelsea, however, was hard-pressed to support the surge of poor Latino migrants that 
entered the community. By 1972, Chelsea had the highest rate of working people with an income 
less than $3,000 and twenty-four percent of Chelsea’s residents lived on that amount as opposed 
to the eleven percent in the metro Boston area. Approximately thirty percent of lodging in 
Chelsea was classified as dilapidated or deteriorated, and the only recently built housing was an 
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eight story high rise of 209 state-subsidized units constructed for the elderly—in 1972. Chelsea 
also had the highest rate of alcoholism in the state and the highest number of children per capita 
who went to the state youth service board. According to one resident, approximately forty 
percent of high school freshmen left school before graduating. Jack Croucher, a resident and an 
advisor to the Community Action Programs Inter City (CAPIC), confirmed the downtrodden 
condition of Chelsea in an article published by the Boston Globe:  
…young people have no reason to stay here, and the middle class is moving out because 
the tax rate is backbreaking—it’s the second highest in the state—and the schools are 
bad. My own parents moved out. They wanted to stay because they had ties here, but it 
wasn’t worth it. And whatever else you might be able to say about them, when the stable 
middle class leaves, you lose something. For example, education and pollution are 
important issues for everyone, but poor people are too concerned with housing to get to 
these other things. It’s almost unfair to bring any more poor people in here. The city can’t 
provide for them. 28
Poor Latinos, however, continued to pour into Chelsea throughout the seventies.  And they came 
because there was employment, housing, and local support.29
Saint Rose’s Catholic Church opened its arms to Chelsea’s Latino population and 
according to Isildro Vega, became the unofficial center of the city’s Hispanic community. As 
Spanish-speakers began to organize, Saint Rose offered parishioners rooms to hold meetings and 
as migrants arrived, established parishioners—such as the Puerto Ricans—loaned money to the 
newcomers.  In fact, according to Isildro Vega, parishioners from Saint Rose used to frequent the 
Cathedral of the Holy Cross on Washington Street in Boston in order to welcome new crops of 
immigrants. Specifically, Isildro recalled that on many occasions the church aided Cuban 
refugees who arrived at the church’s doorstep because, “there wasn’t anybody to meet them.” 
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While the activism associated with the Saint Rose parish might explain why the Cuban Refugee 
Center was located in Chelsea, it was nonetheless true that Cubans and Puerto Ricans were 
settling in Chelsea in large numbers. Cubans found hospitality at the Cuban Refugee Center, and 
Puerto Ricans found employment as low-skilled workers at Suffolk Farms Packing Company, 
Sweetheart Paper Company, and the American Biltrite Incorporated, among others. Though such 
jobs were neither desirable nor skilled, Latinos acted upon available employment opportunities 
and made the most of their new home. 30
Other factors contributing to Latino growth was the city’s small size and decreasing 
population. Chelsea had jobs, was easy to get around, and was an ideal setting for someone who 
did not speak English. Moreover, Chelsea was not a crowded city and it was considered by many 
Latinos to be “better” than Boston. According to Father Borges, the minister of Saint Rose’s in 
1972, Chelsea was a quiet community that offered Latinos the possibility of living in a “peaceful 
village”—which was a reputation that encouraged Latino migration and relocation from New 
York and Springfield. “Mostly it’s family groups and here they can have a stable community. 
Furthermore the city and the social agencies have been very responsive. The former mayor was 
interested in them, and [Mayor] Spelman has continued the good relationship. Other than 
language their problems are the same as the English-speaking residents. The most serious one 
being housing.” 31
 
The Great Fire of 1973 
 
The Great Fire of 1973 intensified the social, economic, and residential woes that beset 
Latinos in Chelsea. The area that was engulfed by yet another industrial conflagration was a 
48 
 
densely populated area of aging tenements, occupied mainly by Spanish-speaking families. 
Thousands of people evacuated their homes and among them were Isildro and his young family 
of five. On October 14, 1973, he and his family sought refuge in the home of Cuban family 
friends in East Boston; from there they watched as their “peaceful village” burned. 32
The conflagration began at 3:56 pm within a shop on Summer Street— just one hundred 
yards away from where the 1908 fire began on Second and Carter Streets. The fire destroyed 
Ward Two in its entirety and caused upwards of $100 million dollars in damages. Over 1,500 
firefighters from all over the state worked day and night to prevent the fire from spreading to 
other wards of the city. More than sixty fire departments answered Chelsea’s call for assistance, 
and came from a radius of seventy miles. The fire billowed a mile along the Mystic River, almost 
reaching the Mystic River Bridge, and reached a half-mile into the city from the waterfront. The 
smoke from the city blanketed Chelsea and spilled over into Winthrop, East Boston, Revere, and 
into Boston Harbor. Local authorities ordered residents of Everett Avenue, Fourth, Walnut, 
Arlington, and Elm Streets, among others, to evacuate their homes. The municipality prepared 
the State Armory to accommodate 1,100 displaced persons and in total, 1,000 of Chelsea 
residents registered at the armory. Countless other evacuees found lodging with friends and 
family. The fire destroyed eighteen city blocks and forty-five acres—an area one mile long and 
one-half mile wide. Twelve of the fourteen ruined streets had been the same streets decimated by 
the 1908 fire.  The commercial and residential loss was catastrophic: sixty-one local businesses 
and 127 residencies burned. Not to mention, 600 workers lost their place of employment and 250 
families lost their homes. According to officials, the fire was the third largest in the history of 
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Greater Boston—the largest being the Great Fire of 1908. Though there were no casualties, sixty 
residents were hospitalized along with four firefighters. 33  
The day after the fire Senator Edward M. Kennedy toured the ravaged city. After 
speaking with the mayor and other city officials regarding the economic implications of the fire, 
the senator promised to aid the city in procuring federal funds to cope with the disaster. Senator 
Joseph DiCarlo and Representatives Robert Donovan and Francis Doris also pledged their 
support to rebuild Chelsea. Together, DiCarlo, Donovan, and Doris filed joint legislation that 
would provide $500,000 as emergency relief funds and $10 million in long-term relief through 
the purchasing of state bonds. The congressman presented the bill requesting $10 million as the 
Disaster Relief Loan Act of 1973. As for local mobilization, city officials made the Williams 
School the central headquarters for all relief efforts; several supermarket chains offered 
unlimited supplies to aid the city’s evacuees; and the city created the Chelsea Fire Disaster Fund. 
At the insistence of state officials such as Governor Francis W. Sargent and Sen. Kennedy, 
President Nixon declared Chelsea a disaster area on the seventeenth of October—just two days 
after the fire. The designation was the first in the country’s history following a major fire; 
normally, only flood and hurricane-torn areas merited such a grave title. As a result of Nixon’s 
declaration, Chelsea received the services of seven federal departments. The Department of 
Housing and Development (HUD) handled the allocation of temporary housing, the most 
immediate concern, and offered grants for the construction of housing comparable to that before 
the fire. The federal Small Business Administration (SBA) provided loans payable over thirty 
years at five percent interest to business owners whose insurance did not cover their losses. The 
SBA also provided loans to individuals in order to finance the loss of personal property. The 
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Environmental Protection Agency paid for damages caused to the sewage and water systems. 
The Department of Agriculture sent surplus food items to the city and supplemented the city’s 
supply of food stamps. The Federal Highway Authority assumed the cost of repairing all roads 
damaged by the conflagration and the Labor Department reimbursed the Massachusetts 
Department of Employment Security for money spent aiding Chelsea’s residents who had lost 
their place of employment. Federal funds were also made available to repair the Williams Street 
School, City Hall, and all other municipal buildings destroyed by the fire.  34
Though crucial to the rehabilitation process of the city, the federal and state aid that 
poured into Chelsea managed only to address the city’s most superficial needs. The fire, noted an 
editorial of the Chelsea Record, was inevitable and unavoidable. The city had known that the 
area that burned was a tinderbox; that run-down housing stock posed a risk to the city’s 
residents; that state insurance officials had warned that the water pressure in the local hydrants 
was too low, and yet necessary precautions were not taken. Not to mention, the city was already 
aware of its predisposition to fire given that the Gulf Oil Fire of 1969, and another dozen fires, 
had blazed during the interim of the two great fires of 1908 and 1973. Chelsea had long been 
subject to the whims and decisions of state projects, local industry, and misguided municipal 
government. The leading issue in Chelsea was not that the city sat in a mass of decay, but that 
Chelsea’s residents were the victims of an environment and circumstances beyond their control.   
An eyewitness account of the fire showed the level of desperation and vulnerability facing the 
residents of Chelsea in the aftermath of the fire.  
I walked around the entire area, an area I had known well. A sense of helplessness 
overtook me as I looked north and south, east and west. Chelsea burned last night the 
Boston papers wrote. But what did they know? Who but the people of this proud city 
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could comprehend the magnitude of this incredible loss? Who but the proud people of 
this city could weigh and measure that thankless task that lay ahead if the city was to 
recover and go forward? Who but the people of this city would care that Ward Two had 
disappeared in a funnel of smoke and burning embers up into the sky?” 35
In comparison to Walter Pratt’s account of the 1908 fire, this description of the 1973 fire painted 
an honest portrait of a troublesome future. From the vantage point of the average Chelsea 
resident, everything had been lost to the flames of the fire and a full recovery was neither 
imminent nor likely.  
The group of residents that most acutely felt the immediate effects of the fire was 
Chelsea’s Latino population. As the city’s most recent and vulnerable newcomers, many 
Spanish-speaking residents lost everything they had to the fire. Mayor Spelman called for 
clothing donations, directed them to Saint Rose’s Church, and placed them in the care of Father 
Borges—presumably for the purpose of distributing them to his Latino congregation. The town 
called in forty Spanish-speaking volunteers and the Hispanic administrator of the Atlanta Small 
Business Administration in order to aid communication between Latino residents and relief 
authorities. Spanish-speaking families, like that of Mrs. Santa Ruiz, densely populated the 
tenements of Ward Two. Mrs. Ruiz and her six children evacuated their home and lost 
everything to the fire, “when I walked into the street with the children, the whole house caught 
on fire.”  Claudio Mitro, another Latino resident of Chelsea, also suffered losses. He reported to 
the police that a blue suitcase containing a Spanish Bible, a pair of binoculars, and ten shirts, had 
been stolen from him as he fled from his burning apartment on Chestnut Street.  36  
In the aftermath of the fire, Chelsea received millions of dollars worth of state and federal 
funds.  In total, the town accepted $5 million in state urban renewal funds, a five-year $7.5 
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million federal community development grant, and a total of $15 million pledged by the federal 
and state governments. The city used a lot of the money to repair city hall and other damaged 
buildings, erect new infrastructure, and redesign the city’s water system—which had, in part, 
contributed to the magnitude of the fire due to low water pressure. As for the remaining funds, 
they went towards the completion of the city’s Urban Renewal Project at Murray Industrial 
Park.37
 The construction of Murray Industrial Park was an opportunity lost for Chelsea’s 
community. Instead of constructing much needed housing, the Urban Renewal Project created 
new space for commercial and business real estate. In fact, not one single housing development 
was built with funds received after the fire.   That being said, plans to build Murray Industrial 
Park had been underway since 1972, and officials estimated that eighty percent of the buildings 
destroyed by the fire were within the boundaries of the city’s Urban Renewal Project.  As for 
what became of the remaining eight blocks, all but the area directly behind the Williams School 
was amended into the urban renewal area. At one point there was talk of adjusting the project to 
include 250 housing units behind the Williams School but in the end, nothing came of such a 
proposal. Shortly after the fire, the city began to acquire 400 parcels of land, relocate 400 
families and individuals, and reposition 200 businesses and junkyards in preparation for what 
would become Murray Industrial Park.38
 In a desperate attempt to revive Chelsea’s economy and curb forthcoming 
deindustrialization, the city erected the industrial park and replaced the former “rag-shop” 
district with office condos, banks, medical buildings, the Mystic River Mall, and a seven-story 
hotel, along with other locations for white-collar businesses. In the process, Chelsea’s federal 
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and state-funded urban renewal completely overlooked the needs of its lower class residents. The 
fire had destroyed homes that housed the city’s expanding Latino population and moreover, 
accelerated deindustrialization, thereby limiting employment opportunities for the working class. 
Lingering Jewish proprietors closed their doors, and factories did not bother to rebuild on the 
property that the Great Fire of 1973 had singed. The Murray Industrial Park, as the Executive 
Director of the Chelsea Urban Renewal Authority forewarned, was not Chelsea’s grand 
salvation, “sometimes it seems to listen to certain people that all Chelsea’s problems are in the 
100 acres of the renewal project. That there are no dilapidated buildings, no fires, no delayed 
programs anywhere else in the city. . . Urban Renewal cannot be the salvation of Chelsea—as it 
promises to be—if there is no city around to save.” From 1950 to 1970 the city suffered from 
high taxes, substandard housing, ecological misuse, and demonstrated symptoms of future 
problems such as drug abuse and widespread discrimination. And yet for twenty years the only 
decisions that the municipality made were ones that placed the burden of urban decline on the 
shoulders of its residents. The city needed lower homeowner taxes and affordable housing, but 
instead Chelsea attempted—yet again—to stimulate the economy with industrial growth. But in 
light of an evolving national economy that had begun to favor the service sector over the 
industrial, pro-commercial policies proved futile. Deindustrialization was well underway; as a 
result, Latinos did not rise out of the ashes of fire in the same, upward fashion as the Jews had 
sixty-five years earlier.39
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Chapter Three: 
 
Combating Crisis: Urban Decline and Chelsea’s Latino Boom, 1973-1990 
 
 
 Following the Fire of 1973, Chelsea’s population changed dramatically. In a survey 
conducted by the city in 1978, the city’s Hispanic population had risen to 19.5 percent of the 
total population. Less than one-fourth of the Latinos living in Chelsea had resided there for five 
or more years and approximately half of the population had arrived during the past three years. 
As “white flight” and deindustrialization spurred the decline of the overall population, the 
availability of housing and, to a lesser extent, jobs ushered in waves of Latino migrants, with 
Central Americans and Puerto Ricans heavily represented. Chelsea’s Latino boom sent 
shockwaves through the small city.  The influx of low-income, Spanish-speaking residents 
changed the face of Chelsea and, moreover, changed the needs of an already “dying” 
community. Fraught with urban crisis and brimming with residents of low and moderate means, 
Chelsea successfully solicited federal funds for a variety of projects under the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974. Latinos, however, were seldom the intended beneficiaries 
of these projects. Though the city was clearly standing on the brink of demographic succession, 
Chelsea chose not to accommodate its new residents. The city built luxury housing instead of 
affordable housing, opted for elderly developments instead of family developments. The Latinos 
of Chelsea were victims and bystanders of their environment. Though they inherited a city 
already in decay, the Hispanic population bore the blame of preexisting urban troubles and bore 
the burden of municipal blunders.1  
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“If you can’t find anyplace elsewhere to live you jump into Chelsea.”2
 As a community buried by a bridge, encircled by oil tanks, plagued by contaminated, 
junk-filled land, and burned twice by conflagration, Chelsea found it difficult to retain middle-
class families. In 1960, Chelsea’s general population numbered 33,749 persons; in 1970, 30,639; 
and by1980 the population reached an all time low of 25,431. Not since 1880 had Chelsea 
housed a population below 25,000. Mayor Joel Pressman, who served from 1976 to 1983, 
attributed the efflux of Chelsea’s residents to “fires, general deterioration and abandonment, high 
taxes and few amenities and fewer services.” Not to mention there was a shortage of single-
family homes and limited employment opportunities. Rental housing, on the other hand, was 
plentiful; as rents in Boston skyrocketed, Chelsea’s lower cost of living became an attraction for 
immigrants. It was no coincidence that the rapid growth of Chelsea’s Latino population took 
place during a period that also witnessed an overall demographic decline. A study of historic 
Boston neighborhoods conducted by Mauricio Gastón and Marie Kennedy of the University of 
Massachusetts indicated that minorities, such as blacks and Latinos, tended to move into areas 
previously occupied by white ethnics. As industry fled, what were once poor, but stable 
communities of European immigrants succumbed to the woes of disinvestment. Disinvestment 
preserved low levels of rents and as a result, people of color replaced white ethnic workers.  
Indeed, this phenomenon was true of Chelsea. The city’s Latino population quadrupled during 
the 1970s, increasing from 3.6 percent of the population in 1970 to at least 14.2 percent in 1980.3  
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Table 1: Total and Hispanic Population in Chelsea4
 1970 1980 1990 
Total population 
 
30,639 
 
 
25,431 
 
 
28,222 
 
 
Hispanics (%) 1098 (3.6) 3602-5433 (14.2) 11,800-12,7000 (42-45) 
 
The Census of 1980 unveiled a demographic portrait of Chelsea that was unlike anything 
the city had ever seen. Immigrants from South America, Central America, Mexico, and Cuba 
comprised the most populous group of foreign-born residents in the city; Spanish-speakers 
constituted the largest group of non-English speakers; and persons of Spanish origin dominated 
the ethnicities of the native-born. White ethnics no longer composed the majority of Chelsea’s 
immigrants; the Latinos had taken their place. Officially, 3,602 Latinos lived in Chelsea, but in 
reality the population was much larger.  Some non-English speaking Latinos were likely missed 
by census takers, and the growing numbers of undocumented immigrants from Central America 
were no doubt undercounted. The figure of 3,602 persons was a minimum and a low projection 
of the actual Latino population; a study conducted by the Gaston Institute of the University of 
Massachusetts suggested that the population was closer to 5,433 persons at the time of the 
census.5
Accompanying the news of the sudden growth of Chelsea’s Latino population was the 
awareness that the community was already demonstrating signs of stress. A higher percentage of 
the city’s Hispanics were eligible for assistance from the federal Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), resided in rental households, reported inadequate housing 
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conditions, and lived in an overcrowded environment. The Hispanic population was also much 
younger than the city’s overall demographic, and the educational development of Latino children 
lagged far behind the children of non-Hispanic families. In 1980 the median age of Chelsea 
Latinos was 17.2 years, whereas the median age of non-Hispanics was 37.6 years. Seventy-five 
percent of the Latino population had not completed a high school education, and only one 
percent of the Latino population had completed four or more years of college.  Given the high 
proportion of young children, Latino residential patterns were overwhelmingly dominated by 
large family households with children under the age of six.   Ninety-five percent of Latinos lived 
in family households, averaging 4.1 persons per household, as opposed to the 81 percent of non-
Hispanics who lived in family households, averaging 3.2 persons.  Latinos required large family 
residential units, but no such units were erected during the 1973-1990 period—when Latino 
population soared. Their families tended to be larger than non-Hispanics, but given that their 
income was lower, adequately sized apartments could not be financed. At the time, the average 
price of homes in Chelsea was $120,000-150,000, while the income needed to purchase such a 
home ranged from $44,000 to $55,000. The average income of Latino residents was far below 
this range. In 1979, the median family income of Hispanic families was $6,519. 6
 
Table 2: Median family income by race/ethnicity, 1979 7
 Whites Blacks Hispanics 
Chelsea 16,090 15,096 6,519 
Boston 18,816 11,779 9,027 
   
The pronounced indigence of Chelsea’s Latinos was a phenomenon typical of Greater 
Boston. In a national comparison between economic and racial groups in metropolitan Boston 
and 11 other urban areas, Chicago’s Urban League discovered that Boston Latinos had the worst 
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educational and economic status among whites, blacks, and even other Latinos nationally. The 
manufacturing base that propelled the economic advancement of Boston’s European immigrants 
was all but gone when the Latino boom was in full swing. Between 1965 and 1987, Suffolk 
County (where Chelsea is located) lost 50 percent of the positions once available to 
manufacturing workers. The industries that remained were food processing plants and packaging 
firms: both of which offered jobs characterized by low wages and poor working conditions. 
Kayem Inc. and the New England Produce Company are two examples of the industry that 
remained. Despite the tendency to relocate, Kayem, a marketer and manufacturer of some of the 
leading brands of meats in Massachusetts and the country, chose to expand the plant instead of 
leaving Chelsea. In operation since 1909, Kazimierz Monkiewicz founded the Kayem factory 
after emigrating from Poland. At the beginning of the century, Kayem was no more than a meat 
market, but by close of the century it had become the number-one brand of hot dogs in New 
England and the number one brand of chicken sausage in the entire country. (Alumni Stadium at 
Boston College is one of the many distributers of its hot dogs.) The other manufacturer that 
remained in Chelsea was the New England Produce Center—also known as the Chelsea Produce 
Center. Originally located in the docking area of Fanueil Hall, forty-two distributors of 
wholesale produce moved to Chelsea after unsuccessfully searching for a site in Boston.  Upon 
relocating to Chelsea in 1968, the distributors became incorporated as the New England Produce 
Center. Together these two manufacturers employed a large percentage of Latinos in the Chelsea 
workforce.8   
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, socioeconomic turmoil consumed 
Chelsea’s Latino population because the city itself was in the throes of crisis. Utterly dependent 
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upon industry during the fifties and sixties, Chelsea suffered as Boston began to transition from a 
manufacturing economy to a service economy. Given that Chelsea’s industry remained viable for 
most of the seventies, the city felt the effects of deindustrialization most acutely during the 
eighties.  In 1984, American Biltrite Inc., Sweetheart Paper Co., and Cabot Paint all closed their 
doors in Chelsea. Five hundred jobs that were once available were no more; and without a 
growing service sector in the city to compensate for the loss, unemployment rose. Only seventy 
percent of Chelsea’s Hispanic labor force held full-time positions in 1980, and of those who were 
employed forty-five percent worked in the manufacturing sector. While disproportionately 
employed in the industrialized sector, Chelsea Latinos were underrepresented in white-collar and 
civic jobs such as finance and transportation. Consequently, Latinos bore the brunt of 
deindustrialization. Between 1980 and 1988, the total number of jobs in Chelsea grew by just 
one percent, while, during those same years the Latino population grew by at least twenty 
percent. This strikingly slow job growth was not substantial enough to maintain the rapid growth 
of the Hispanic community. During the same decade, Massachusetts underwent tremendous 
growth in the service sector and associated employment—but mainly in downtown Boston and 
its more affluent suburbs. Without a budding service sector, Chelsea lagged behind. Brian 
Krasner of the Community Development Department in Chelsea noted that wholesale trade, 
especially trade concerning the produce markets, was one of only two sectors that experienced 
growth during this period.9
 In spite of deindustrialization and high levels of unemployment, the Latino population 
underwent rapid growth during the eighties. Chelsea was a “city of immigrants,” and the 
insecurity of the housing and employment markets did not deter further expansion. Chelsea had 
62 
 
low rents—certainly lower than those of Boston—and moreover, it was in the position to supply 
many of its citizens with state and federal vouchers. In fact, the rate of Latino growth during the 
seventies was so astounding that the city began to gain recognition as a “haven” for Latino 
immigrants. Between 1986 and 1987, Chelsea, along with Boston, Lawrence, Springfield, 
Holyoke, and Worcester, was one of the cities with the highest proportion of Hispanic births in 
the state. As the Latino population grew, the city became more and more attractive to incoming 
migrants as chain migration facilitated the development of a local Latino community. What had 
been the Blue Moon Deli and a favorite of the defunct Jewish community, gave way to the 
Lechonera Criolla, a restaurant that specialized in home-style pork, a staple of Latin culture. The 
transition of leases not only signified a change of ownership but a change of identity. Chelsea 
was one of the most diverse and ethnically mixed communities in the state, and the city’s 
emerging Latino identity became a beacon for new migrants.  Chelsea may not have been the 
ideal place to live well, but for the waves of Central Americans arriving during the late seventies 
and eighties, more affordable housing and a familiar culture made Chelsea a popular destination. 
10
 Moreover, the economic and political instability of Central America in the 1970s and 
1980s forced thousands of Salvadorans, Hondurans, Nicaraguans, and Guatemalans, to flee their 
native land and seek residency in the U.S. The threat of left-wing revolutions—like Cuba’s 
successful revolution in 1959—led the U.S. government to sponsor the despotic oligarchies and 
dictatorial rulers who wielded power at the expense of the general population. Human rights 
abuses by Central American military regimes were widespread. By the late 1970s, insurgents 
began to mobilize and conflict erupted in several Central American countries—the first and most 
notable being Nicaragua. On January 10, 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of La Prensa 
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and an opponent of the Somoza family—which comprised the country’s dictatorship—died at the 
hand of Somoza assassins as he was driving to work. Enraging the Nicaraguan people, the event 
catalyzed the resistance, violence, and war that consumed the country for the next eighteen 
months.  The war did not spare any group or class of people; all were affected. The official 
policy of the US under the Reagan administration was to defeat the Sandinista rebellion at all 
costs, and for this reason the administration supported the authoritarian Somoza regime. War 
also erupted in El Salvador and Guatemala, terrorizing the countryside. In particular, rural 
inhabitants of El Salvador and the indigenous in Guatemala underwent continuous military 
aggression. As the military massacred those believed to be involved in guerilla warfare in rural 
El Salvador and Guatemala, indigenous villagers ran for their lives as the military murdered 
leaders of their towns. 11
 Between 1978 and the 1990, approximately 300,000 persons died in the wars in Central 
America, and thousands more fled to nearby countries such as Mexico and the US.  In El 
Salvador alone, 600,000 persons were displaced, and in Nicaragua an estimated 120,000 became 
exiles. In spite of the conflicts that permeated all of Central America, the US government granted 
official refugee status only to the anti-Communist Nicaraguans. Nevertheless, the lack of official 
refugee status did not prevent Honduras, Guatemalans, and El Salvadorians from entering and 
seeking to rebuild their lives in the US. As violence escalated during the 1980s, undocumented 
migrants from all ranks of Central American society filed into the US.  Families with children, 
campesinos, and obreros—groups previously unrepresented among Central American 
migrants—joined the ranks of already established domestic workers and professionals. The 
myriad of experiences that the Central Americans carried with them further complicated the 
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urban landscape of small cities like Chelsea.  Campesinos (roughly “farmers” in English), had 
the dual task of adjusting to urban life in addition to life in the United States. Given their lack of 
experience in factory and constructions settings, rural workers were more susceptible to urban 
exploitation. 12
 According to a study conducted through interviews with people working in social, legal, 
and employment services in Chelsea, it was likely that half of all Hispanics living in Chelsea 
were undocumented by 1990. Persons from El Salvador comprised the majority, but large 
numbers of Hondurans, Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, Colombians, and Mexicans were also 
represented.  By the end of the decade the Central American population was growing at an 
unprecedented rate. Between 1987 and 1990 just over two-thousand immigrants entered into 
Chelsea’s neighborhood and the overwhelming majority hailed from Central America.  
 
Table 3: Shifting Origins of Latinos in Chelsea, 1970-199013
 Cuba Central 
America 
Mexico South 
America 
Spanish 
Speakers 
Total 
Foreign 
Born Total 
Total 
Population 
1970 120 Not listed Not listed 105 1,098 4,399 31,391 
1980 219 Not listed 16 173 2,959 3,215 25,431 
1990 101 2,356 54 320 7,165 6,250 28,710 
 
 
Table 4: Origin of Chelsea’s Central American Population, 199014
 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
1990 81 1,121 458 654 42 0 
 
Including undocumented immigrants, the Gaston Institute of the University of Massachusetts 
estimated that 9,500 Hispanics were living in Chelsea in 1990. Another estimate, made by one of 
Chelsea’s social service agencies, suggested that upwards of 15,000 undocumented Latinos lived 
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in Chelsea. Regardless, both studies agreed that the majority of Chelsea’s undocumented were 
between the ages of fifteen and forty, and they had just recently taken up residency in the city. 
That being said, one of the main consequences of sudden population growth was the increasing 
demand for housing. Chelsea was a city notorious for inadequate housing conditions and a lack 
of residential space. The Latinos who arrived after the fire of 1973 had limited, if any, options of 
where to live. It was common for two or more people to share a single room, and in some 
instances some migrants even found themselves renting the space below a bed.15  
  
“Aren’t Hispanics living in Chelsea our own?”16
Above all, Latinos required adequate, affordable housing. Yet between 1973 and 1990 
this need—though acknowledged—was not met. Struggling to overcome the effects of urban 
disinvestment and ongoing deindustrialization, the city of Chelsea adopted a strategy that sought 
to reinvigorate the city through industrial and commercial development. Industrial and 
commercial developments, however, did not—and could not—rescue the city. Murray Industrial 
Park and Admiral’s Hill, the two major developments built during this period, benefitted 
businesses and people located outside of the city at the expense of Chelsea’s residents. The 
shortage of adequate and affordable housing remained a problem before and after the completion 
of these two developments, and the population that most acutely felt the housing scarcity was the 
Latino population. According to Joshua Resnek, a resident of Chelsea, “what was bad about 
Chelsea got worse” after the commercial and industrial developers left town. For Resnek, it was 
a shame that residential developments meant to provide low-income housing never left the 
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drawing board. Had such projects been executed, he noted, “a lot of lower income people would 
have better housing instead of no housing.” 17
By 1985 Chelsea was a city of multi-unit housing structures: 725 buildings contained a 
single unit; 1,529 contained two units; 948 contained three units; and 455 contained four or more 
units. Between the losses incurred by the two great fires and the flattening of ward two by the 
Mystic River Bridge, single family homes were a dying breed. Rental households comprised 73.3 
percent of all residencies and housed the majority of the population. Chelsea grappled with 
housing shortage and a myriad of housing problems. More than eighty percent of its housing 
stock was aged thirty years or more, and housings troubles such as sewage backup, leaky roofs, 
broken ceilings, and pest infestation were habitually reported.  Nevertheless, a 1976 survey 
showed that Chelsea had a mere one percent vacancy rate. In other words, the city needed 
additional housing; and with the majority of the population eligible for federal assistance, 
presumably, low-income residents needed housing most. 18
Though housing problems affected the entire community, procuring adequate housing 
proved to be exceedingly difficult for Latinos. Members of the Hispanic community were less 
likely to own homes and more likely to rent than their non-Hispanic counterparts. By 1990, 
seventy percent of Chelsea’s population lived in rental housing and Latinos comprised the 
majority of the rental population.  Yet of the thirty percent of Chelsea homeowners, only eight 
percent were Hispanic. Latinos were also less likely to acquire housing. Between 1988 and 1990, 
Hispanics accounted for only eight percent of all property transfers, while non-whites accounted 
for seventy-four percent and companies for seventeen percent. In 1990, Latinos comprised at 
least forty-two percent of the city’s population but purchased only fourteen percent of homes—
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all of which were located in Hispanic neighborhoods. Discrimination in the housing sector 
contributed to the disproportion between Hispanic and non-Hispanic homeownership, and 
redlining was also commonplace in Chelsea. Only one bank, the Chelsea Provident Cooperative 
Bank, lent mortgages to all parts of the city. Most lending agencies were located outside the city 
and did not lend to persons looking to buy real estate in the Latino districts of Chelsea. 19
To make matters worse for the Latino community, absentee landlords—meaning 
landlords who did not live in the buildings they rented—owned forty-one percent of the 
buildings located in Chelsea’s Latino neighborhoods, and seventy-two percent of those landlords 
lived outside of the city.  Many absentee landlords did not repair their units and did not follow 
regulations and codes in regards to their rentals.  Needless to say, living conditions for Hispanics 
was less than adequate. As the Latino community continued to grow, demand for low-income 
housing increased dramatically, but the supply remained the same. Nor were Latinos the only 
group of immigrants in need of modest housing. Inflated rental prices in Boston pushed the 
Cambodians, along with the Latinos, out of many Boston neighborhoods.  Between 1986 and 
1989, Boston’s Cambodian community shrunk from 7300 to fewer than 5000, and some of these 
immigrants ended up in Chelsea. 20
Chelsea’s Hispanic community relied heavily on the assistance of federal and state 
programs to afford lodging that met the needs of their large family households. Under Section 8 
of the United States Housing Act of 1937, the federal government subsidized housing so that 
low-income families spent no more than thirty percent of their income on housing. Likewise 
under Massachusetts’ Chapter 707 program (now referred to as the Massachusetts Rental 
Voucher Program) families who demonstrated considerable need paid only twenty-five percent 
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of their income toward rent and utilities.   In 1990 the Chelsea Housing Authority reported that 
the city had five family developments (494 units), three elderly developments (414 units), and 
807 additional units that relied on either state or federal rent subsidies. While most towns had 
between ten to twenty state 707-subsidized units, Chelsea had 243—and forty-two percent of 
those who occupied these units were Hispanic. Moreover, Chelsea also had 480 units of federal 
Section 8-subsidized units and similar to the state-funded housing, forty percent of those tenants 
were Latino.21
The issue of adequate housing plagued Chelsea’s Hispanic community throughout the 
period between 1973 and 1990. In addition to the difficulties incurred by having lower incomes 
and in many cases illegal status, Latino families struggled to procure and maintain their homes in 
the face of gentrification and discrimination. In June of 1985, a Boston development firm evicted 
fifty neighborhood families from their homes and gave them one month notice to leave. The firm 
had bought four apartment buildings in the city’s Hispanic community and invested in the 
renovation of the decrepit buildings. The renovations, consequently, caused a surge in rents that 
the Latino families could not afford.  Though there was no indication where these families 
moved, being evicted was merely the first of many woes to confront such families. Property 
values and rents had been increasing dramatically over the three-year period prior to the eviction 
incident, as had reported incidents of racial discrimination.22
 Discrimination against Latinos intensified during the 1970s and 1980s, and was not 
limited to the housing sector.  As the drug trade infiltrated Chelsea’s community, the entire 
Latino community suffered and bore the blame for the activities of a few. Indeed, the drug trade 
was an insidious issue for Chelsea’s residents. Children, growing up surrounded by smoke and 
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drugs, were caught between the crossfire of competing drug businesses. In 1986, law 
enforcement officials asserted that Chelsea had been a center of drug activity for over a decade. 
The Tobin Bridge ironically made Chelsea an attractive hotspot for drug dealers because it 
provided easy access to the city and areas north and south of Boston. In fact, Chelsea was so 
desirable a location for the drug trade that, according to the Suffolk County Narcotics Task 
Force, no place in the Northeast other than New York City made heroin so widely available. 
During the late eighties, Chelsea authorities launched a drug war that was overwhelmingly 
associated with the Hispanic population. Adopting the narcotics war as his own, Mayor John J. 
Brennan joined a five-person, statewide task force against drugs, and launched an initiative to 
discontinue rent subsidies and welfare cards that were issued to convicted drug dealers. Though 
the Mayor asserted that he was anti-drug and not anti-welfare, his crusade targeted families 
living in Section 8 housing. He believed that there were too many families living by subsidies 
granted to them by Section 8.23  
The drug trade exacerbated racial and ethnic tensions within the community.  Afraid of 
the violence involved in the drug trade, Southeast Asians expressed their distaste for the 
Hispanic community. In a meeting held at El Comite Latino, a local Hispanic organization, a 
Cambodian immigrant noted that she and her family were living in fear of the escalating tension 
that existed between the two populations. On December 18, 1984, four shots from a .24 calibre 
gun flew through the window of a Cambodian family living on Grove Street. Though no one was 
injured in the crossfire, which two Hispanic residents initiated over drug trafficking, the event 
brought considerable negative attention to the Latino community.  In an article entitled 
“Cambodians living in fear here?” the Chelsea Record expressed their dismay and indignation 
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that many of the newly arrived immigrants found Chelsea to be a less than welcoming place.  
The article highlighted the genocide from which the Cambodians fled, their law-abiding 
characteristics, and the sacredness of the family unit in their culture. Ironically, these qualities 
were not unique to the Cambodian community; and yet there was no mention of the genocide and 
war that Chelsea’s Central Americans had escaped.  Clearly, the article was blaming and 
criticizing the Latino community for the city’s drug trade. The article ended by noting that “the 
police blotter here reveals no crimes attributed to Cambodians,” with the assumption being that 
the police blotter was filled to the brim with allegations against members of the Hispanic 
community.  The comparison, however, was neither justified nor fair. Whereas five hundred 
Cambodians lived in Chelsea, there were over eight thousand Latino residents.  As the city’s 
largest minority and as an ethnic group whose presence in Chelsea dated back to the fifties, more 
Hispanics were bound to be involved in the drug trade.  Whereas the real culprit of the city’s 
drug trade was urban decline, many of Chelsea’s residents were quick to blame the Hispanic 
population. Effectively, Hispanic involvement with the lawlessness of the drug trade became a 
vehicle through which Chelsea’s older community expressed their aversion to the changing 
demographic landscape. 24
Though the triumphs of Chelsea’s Latino community were often unsung, the Hispanic 
population had accomplished much during the seventies. Four years before the incident on Grove 
Street, the Chelsea Record had published an article by a Latino resident that saluted and praised 
the successes of the Latino community. Entitled “Chelsea Al Dia: the 70s decade of great influx 
of Hispanic influence in Chelsea” and printed in both English and Spanish, the piece 
acknowledged that the arrival of Latinos had changed the face of Chelsea. Enumerating the toils 
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and achievements of the community, the author expressed a desire to “make note of the 
accomplishments of Chelsea’s Hispanic community because we deserve mention and this has not 
been forthcoming from any other source.”  The printing of this article was a milestone for 
Chelsea’s Hispanic community and the city as a whole.  The author’s association with and 
insight into the happenings of the Latino population provided an important opportunity to bestow 
accolades and to dispel misconceptions. The article championed the unheard voices of “the other 
Chelsea” and launched a dialogue in the public arena regarding race and ethnicity.25
 Chelsea’s Latino community excelled during the 1970s. In fields as diverse as art, 
education, and community action, Latino residents demonstrated that they, too, had contributed 
to the contours of the community.  Dahlia Diaz published two novels that were positively 
received by the literary community; Ester Gonzales contributed beautiful drawings of historic 
places in Chelsea for the Chelsea Calendar of 1979; and a “Banda Latina” emerged at the 
Williams School, which dedicated its efforts to showcasing and sharing Latino music with the 
greater Chelsea neighborhood. In education, a young student named Lucas Rodriguez received a 
national award from Senator Edward Kennedy, who acknowledged his promising intellect, and 
more generally, through the Adult Basic Education Program, many Hispanic adults returned to 
school with the hope of bettering their lives and the livelihood of their families. The Hispanic 
community was not the ailing body that Chelsea publications and leaders made it out to be. 
Actively involved in local politics, a united vote from the Hispanic community in 1975 vaulted 
the young Joel Pressman into the mayoral office with a strikingly close three-vote victory. The 
Hispanic vote had matured to the point that it had considerable influence in the political arena 
and such a feat was a landmark for the growing minority community.  Though the Hispanic vote 
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was not strong enough to elect a Latino into local office, the campaigns of two candidates—
namely Fernando Epaiza, an editor of the Chelsea Record, and Cef Rosa—primed the city’s 
political terrain for greater Hispanic participation in the decades to follow. 26  
 The labors of LUCHA (Latinos de Chelsea en Accion) demonstrated yet another source 
of communal potency and development. As the only Hispanic corporation operating in Chelsea 
during the seventies and much of the eighties, the organization dedicated its efforts to providing 
housing, education, social, and cultural services to the Hispanic community. Most notably, 
LUCHA filed a civil rights suit against the municipal and federal governments for discriminating 
against Hispanics in housing and employment.  Though the organization failed to convince the 
court that the terms of construction of the residential development at Admiral’s Hill—one of the 
projects in question—was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, 
LUCHA’s efforts nonetheless placed pressure on the city of Chelsea to provide benefits for and 
reduce discrimination against the Hispanic community. The court acknowledged that Chelsea’s 
actions demonstrated a lack of commitment to the well being of its minority residents. For 
decades the city had used the majority of its federal funds for programs that were not intended to 
benefit the city’s Latino community.27
 
Chelsea, Chelsea tell me please, is it a city or a disease? 
 Admiral’s Hill was the largest housing development erected between 1973 and 1990. Built 
on the land once occupied by the U.S. Naval Hospital (also known as the Chelsea Naval 
Hospital), the project was anticipated to be the “saving grace” of Chelsea. City leaders hailed the 
redevelopment of the Naval Hospital as a “new beginning for Chelsea,” but, low-cost housing 
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was not on the agenda. The city’s proposal called for construction of a luxury housing 
development, rehabilitation of existing housing, restoration of a historic area, development of a 
twenty-six-acre public park, commercial and recreational access to the waterfront, and “light” 
industrial expansion on twenty acres. By way of the proposal alone, clearly, the city’s vision of 
the future was not taking into account the exponentially growing Latino community. The housing 
project was a “hilltop development” that overlooked and undermined the needs of Chelsea’s low-
income residents. Without low-income housing, only a small fraction of Chelsea’s Latinos 
benefited from the multi-million dollar investment.28
 By the time the Chelsea Naval Hospital closed in 1974, the hospital grounds boasted 
eighty-eight acres and over sixty buildings. For 137 years, the hospital had offered continuing 
service to the town of Chelsea and to veterans from across the country. Over the years, the 
hospital had opened its doors to the residents of Chelsea injured by the industrial disasters that 
struck the city; and most notably the hospital treated the victims of the fires of 1908 and 1973. It 
was an honor for Chelsea to be the home of a U.S. Naval Hospital. In addition to being the 
country’s oldest naval hospital in ongoing service, the facility was also known for treating 
Presidents John F. Kennedy and John Quincy Adams—before and after their presidencies 
respectively.  29
 When the hospital closed on January 7, 1975, it denoted the end of an era both for maritime 
and local history. Lieutenant Commander James O. Wilder, the head of the hospital, remarked 
that the decommissioning of the hospital presented a remarkable opportunity for Chelsea to 
reinvent itself. “Now is the time for us to look to the future. . . As this hospital has become old 
and tired, so has its surrounding community. The hospital has almost one-fourth the land mass of 
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the City of Chelsea and the prospect of this land breathing new life into an area that has no place 
to expand is monumental. New land has always been the base for new prosperity.” How best to 
breathe new life into the city, however, was a contentious issue. While Wilder noted that the land 
previously occupied by the hospital would surely benefit the citizens of Chelsea, what he did not 
mention was which citizens. Sold by the city to Edward Fish of Peabody Construction, Inc. in 
Braintree, the naval hospital project called for the construction of luxury and elderly 
residencies.30
The $85 million dollar naval hospital development—along with Murray Industrial Park—
remained the top priorities of the city administration. Upon taking office in 1976, Mayor 
Pressman remarked that Chelsea represented the “smallest” and “weakest” link in the chain of 
cities and towns called Massachusetts, “our link was burned from the catastrophe of 1973 and 
thick with the rust of political inertia and neglect of long range planning.”  In regards to the 
future, however, he pledged that the development of the Chelsea Naval Hospital would mark the 
beginning of a new era, and many residents agreed. At the dedication ceremony of the project, 
federal, state, and local officials celebrated the development as an airplane flew overhead 
carrying a banner that read “Chelsea Pride.” U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey, Governor Edward J. 
King, ex-Governor Michael Dukakis, Mayor Pressman, and Mayor Spelman, all of whom were 
in attendance, lauded the project for the $1 million in tax revenue that the city would inevitably 
collect. Likewise, Andrew Quigley, the former mayor and current editor of the Chelsea Record, 
praised the redevelopment for the new residents it would attract. In an editorial he wrote for the 
Chelsea Record, Quigley predicted that the project would have a positive snowball effect on the 
entire city. “And then a few years after that, the rest of Ward One will be improved with office 
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workers moving in from Boston because they won’t be able to afford the high rents of Boston or 
to buy a condominium . . . all decent respectable workers from Boston or the airport will go to 
work from their well kept homes and apartments.”31
Effectively, Quigley’s editorial articulated what was, presumably, a shared hope that 
Admiral’s Hill would be the key to reversing the “white flight” that left the city in the hands of 
lower income residents and Latinos in the first place. Luxury housing did not attract blue-collar, 
immigrant workers but middle and upper-class “decent respectable workers.” If Admiral’s Hill 
was the cornerstone of a new chapter of Chelsea history then the new Chelsea that Quigley and 
others envisioned was one without a sizeable Latino population. As was made evident by 
Quigley’s remarks, the purpose of the Admiral Hill development was not to tend to the needs of 
a “dying” community, but to attract new, “more desirable” residents whose presence would 
reinvigorate the city. In fact, according to some Latino residents, the development at Admiral’s 
Hill was indeed averse to welcoming Latino residents. On the other hand, Isildro Vega—a 
longtime resident of Puerto Rican descent—insisted that the claim that the development “did not 
want Hispanics” was a myth. He went on to emphasis economic factors, explaining that “you 
have to have a lot of money to buy a house, and we (the Latinos) did not come with a lot of 
money.”32  In all likelihood, both race and class played a role in discouraging Latino settlement 
in Admiral Hill. 
 The partiality of the Admiral’s Hill development did not go unnoticed. While middle and 
upper-income residents directly benefited from the housing project, low-income residents were 
only indirect beneficiaries. According to the Boston Area Office of the HUD, though the 
proposal lacked low-income housing, “revitalization of the surrounding neighborhoods would 
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provide expanded housing opportunities for low and moderate-income persons” and moreover, 
the project itself would create three hundred jobs that were previously unavailable to lower-
income persons.  LUCHA, however, was not convinced that that new development provided 
equal opportunities to Chelsea’s residents. In October of 1978, LUCHA, along with four 
passionate Hispanic residents, filed suit against the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development. In the case—which began as a complaint against Admiral’s Hill but expanded to 
encompass other grievances as well—the plaintiffs posed a two-fold challenge against the 
disbursement of federal funds to the cities of Boston and Chelsea and the discriminatory 
allocation of those funds by the officials of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
More specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the HUD did not ensure that minorities had equal 
access to the benefits of the projects funded under the Urban Development Action Grant 
(UDAG) and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs—the two primary 
reservoirs of federal monies.33
 The primary objective of the Housing and Community Development Act was to 
encourage the “development of viable urban communities, by providing decent housing and a 
suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of 
low and moderate income.”  The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), the Small 
Cities Program (SCP), and the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) were all created to 
meet the objectives of the HDCA; and over the course of the seventies Chelsea received federal 
grants from each one. Most notably, Chelsea applied and received $6,794,000 in UDAG funds 
for the Admiral’s Hill development. Though both the UDAG and the CDBG programs had 
nondiscrimination requirements, nondiscrimination provisions were only written into the 
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eligibility requirements of the former. The specific purpose of the UDAG program was to funnel 
federal dollars into the nation’s hard-pressed cities through proposing projects that took 
“advantage of unique opportunities to attract private investment, stimulate investment in 
restoration of deteriorated or abandoned housing stock, or solve critical problems resulting from 
loss of employment or chronic unemployment in the community.” 34
 As a city beset by urban crisis and full of low and moderate-income citizens, Chelsea 
fared well in the market for CDBG and UDAG funds. Chelsea participated in the CDBG 
program for five years. Between 1975 and 1980, CDBG grants benefited several Latino 
neighborhoods through one, providing services such as fire prevention, housing code 
enforcement, playground development, street lighting, and road construction and two, allocating 
funds to a bilingual day care center and a housing-oriented legal services program. Chelsea’s 
participation in the UDAG program, however, was far less even-handed. As a federal program 
with a clear and deliberate nondiscriminatory clause, the absence of low-income housing from 
the Admiral’s Hill proposal caused quite the stir. The proposal called for the construction of 300 
luxury apartments, 570 market rate apartments, 300 subsidized apartments for the elderly, and 
the rehabilitation of 132 low-income family units in a nearby neighborhood.35
 While the city waited to receive project approval from the HUD, both the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 
Division (FHEO) gave the housing proposal low marks. The FHEO rated Chelsea’s proposal as 
“fair” commenting that it “minimally reduced the magnitude of special problems of minority 
persons” and included no provision for low-income jobs. Likewise MCAD recommended that 
the UDAG conditionally approve the grant pending the addition of equal opportunity conditions. 
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In particular, the commission advocated for the inclusion of low-income housing for younger 
families due to the high proportion of minorities among the non-elderly population. This 
suggestion, however, was not heeded. Though the MCAD review and LUCHA’s formal 
complaint were still underway, HUD informed Chelsea’s mayor that the city had been deemed 
eligible for UDAG funds. Despite receiving frequent criticism from local reviewing agencies, 
Chelsea chose not to amend the project proposal and went ahead with construction. 36
On April 12, 1986, after eight years of appeals and challenges, the court ruled that there 
was no violation of antidiscrimination laws in regards to employment, housing, and contracts 
related to the Admiral’s Hill development. According to the court, LUCHA and the plaintiffs 
failed to prove discriminatory intent and without demonstrating intent, the defendant was not in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Though the UDAG grant chose to assist other groups instead of focusing on the housing needs of 
minorities, the court argued that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence proving that the town 
constructed subsidized housing in spite of the need for minority housing. Additionally, the 
decision noted that the project did not “entirely ignore the needs of minorities.” The project 
enabled the expansion of the Sweetheart Paper Products Co., a large employer of low-income 
persons, and reserved fifteen percent of work hours for minority residents. Neither of these job 
opportunities, however, was permanent. Sweetheart Paper Products left Chelsea in 1984, two 
years before the date of the final decision, and by 1986 Admiral’s Hill was fully constructed and 
no longer employing minority residents. And moreover, in the year prior to the court’s decision, 
MCAD ruled that Chelsea was not in compliance with civil rights standards. Out of almost five-
hundred municipal employees, fewer than ten percent were Hispanic, even though Hispanics 
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then made up twenty-five percent of the population. LUCHA may not have been able to prove 
discriminatory intent, but Massachusetts authorities nonetheless reported that the municipality 
employed discriminatory practices. In the end, “not ignoring” the needs of the Latino community 
was nothing more than a euphemism for discriminatory aims. 37
The Admiral’s Hill project opened in 1986 and was, to a certain extent, a municipal 
success. The redevelopment of the hospital property enticed other developers to invest in 
Chelsea, and for six years—at the onset of the eighties—Chelsea was a boomtown. Nevertheless, 
the developing boom and the Latino boom were not in sync.  Development was limited to 
industrial projects and to the Admiral’s Hill project. The Margolis apartments, located at 260 
Clarke Avenue was the only other housing development to be built between 1973 and 1990. 
Consisting of a brick exterior and thirteen floors, the Margolis Apartments housed 151 units, 144 
of which were one-bedroom apartments and eight of which were two-bedroom apartments. 
Again, federal aid helped to construct the Margolis apartments which were intended to be 
housing for the elderly and not for families or low-income residents. Indeed, in the short-term the 
developing boom was beneficial in so far as it caused the value of properties and tax revenues to 
increase, but in the long-term, the surge in development worsened Chelsea’s urban decline. Once 
investment stopped, what was bad about Chelsea got worse. The arrival and departure of 
developers in Chelsea during the eighties shattered any remaining hope that Chelsea could be 
refashioned as an attractive locale for middle-class workers and moreover, exposed the 
opportunity cost of not constructing housing for the city’s low-income residents. 38
Writing for the Chelsea Record, Joshua Resnek published an article in 1990 spelling out 
Chelsea’s mistakes during the past decade. Entitling the article “What has been, shall be in the 
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future,” Resnek criticized city officials for relying too heavily on developers to invest money in 
the city and thereby increase the value of property. The developers, Resnek noted, came to 
Chelsea to make money; after they left, the bleak future of the status quo reemerged. By 1990, 
the last territorial frontier available for development was the waterfront, but rag shops and oil 
refineries had physically ravaged that waterfront for over a century. Blighted by vacant lots and 
rundown factories, the land was contaminated by toxic waste, isolated by limited roads, and 
caught between multiple ownership of land parcels. What was once valuable property was now 
wasteland, but it was all Chelsea had left. In 1986 the city hired Carol Thomas to study the 
waterfront in the hopes that it would provide Chelsea with one last chance to initiate industrial 
and residential development. Yet Thomas’ study, instead of recommending the land for future 
construction, described Chelsea Creek—the channel separating Chelsea from Boston—as 
Greater Boston’s wasteland.  “The waterfront literally was the dumping area of the Boston area 
for a long time. . . bodies that criminals would dump there. Rag factories. Any use nobody 
wanted would end up in Chelsea Creek. It’s too valuable. It’s incredible you’d have this kind of 
activity and be 3-5 minutes to Logan Airport.” By the end of the 1980s, Chelsea’s physical 
setting and human situation were analogous. Just as the waterfront had been devalued by the 
demands of industrialization and the erection of the Mystic River Bridge so, too, had the Latinos 
of Chelsea been cheapened by association with a city already rife with urban turmoil. 39
 
The onset of urban crisis predated the rise of the city’s Latino population. Permeated with 
problems, towns in the Greater Boston area had long recognized—and singled out—Chelsea as a 
town that struggled to climb the social ladder. In fact, an old football cheer from one of 
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Chelsea’s rival high schools went so far as to liken Chelsea to an ailment, “Chelsea, Chelsea tell 
me please, is it a city or a disease?” Indeed, according to neighbors in the Boston area, if the 
world was filled with winners and losers, then Chelsea was a city filled with the latter. There 
were, however, some “winners” in Chelsea, they just tended to be developers or city officials and 
not the general public. As the 1970s witnessed a change in federal attitude towards small, 
undeveloped cities, large sums of money became available for urban regeneration. Urban neglect 
characterized the fifties and sixties, but with the passage of the Housing and Community 
Development Act in 1974, that policy changed dramatically. The HDCA granted local 
governments the authority to allocate federal funds and as a result, local jurisdictions were more 
capable of assessing the needs of their community. But the expansive power of Chelsea’s local 
authorities spelled death for the flailing city and its Latino constituents. The mayoral office was 
corrupt, the municipal leadership shortsighted, and the general public apathetic to the needs of 
low-income residents. 40
Between 1973 and 1990, Chelsea was a city at odds with itself.  Unbeknownst to the 
constituents of “Old Chelsea,” white flight had bequeathed their city to the Latino population.  
As the predominantly white, middle-class left the city to settle in suburbia, low-income residents 
and Latinos became a permanent fixture of the urban milieu. With little to offer in the way of 
single-family houses and white-collar jobs, Chelsea failed to capture the imagination of the 
second and third generations of the city’s European immigrants. The Latinos, on the other hand, 
came to stay. Chain migration united families, friends, and compatriots in Chelsea and moreover, 
led to the fortification of kinship networks and a Latino identity that perpetuated the growth of 
the Spanish-speaking community. Though Chelsea’s future was inevitably Latino, the city was 
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still in the hands of “Old Chelsea” and the leaders of that constituency had a competing idea of 
what the future had in store. Even as the Latino population boomed, long-time residents never 
relinquished the hope that the city would be restored to the glory of Powderhorn Hill and pre-
1908 Bellingham Square. Caught between competing images of the city’s future, the Latino 
population suffered as “Old Chelsea” constructed a future that omitted its Latino residents; and 
nowhere was that omission more apparent than in the construction of the residential development 
at Admiral’s Hill. Instead of building affordable, family units, the city erected luxury and elderly 
housing that de facto excluded the Latino population. Though there was no proof of 
discriminatory intent, the city’s proposal, nonetheless, disregarded the needs of a large portion of 
its population.  
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Conclusion: 
Urban Industrial Life and the Fate of Ethnic Communities 
 
From the beginning to the end of the twentieth century, Chelsea had a distinct industrial 
character and a unique set of urban problems that dictated the trajectory of the city’s Jewish and 
Latino communities. Proximity to Boston and the city’s waterways encouraged manufacturing 
enterprises and likewise, accessibility and employment opportunities that accelerated the influx 
of immigrants and the development of Jewish and Latino communities. Ethnic neighborhoods 
emerged as older communities dwindled. Throughout the years, many of Chelsea’s residents left 
as a consequence of fire and crisis, and others abandoned the city in search of greater prosperity 
and comfort outside of the inner-urban environment. Chelsea’s Jews and Latinos, however, 
lacked the means to choose to stay or to leave—at least at first. When Chelsea burned, the Jews 
and Latinos suffered tremendous losses; and while the city renewed itself, the ethnic 
communities struggled to follow suit. Under pressure to begin anew, Jews and later Latinos in 
Chelsea were tied to the heart of the city.  During the rise of the Jews, Chelsea had begun a new 
chapter in its history whereas during the ascendance of the Latino population, the livelihood of 
the city’s residents was no more than a footnote. Following the fire of 1908, there was industrial 
prosperity and opportunity for Jewish ascension, but after the fire of 1973 there was only urban 
decline and stagnation for the Latino community. As a post-industrial city with a bridge running 
through it, Chelsea was past its prime long before the Latinos settled down. Chelsea’s Hispanic 
community inherited the city’s problems but it did not create them. For better or for worse, 
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Chelsea had always been a “city under fire” and it was exactly that feature that defined the city 
and her residents.  
Throughout the twentieth century Chelsea’s urban milieu withstood extraordinary 
physical abuse. Although industry was always a crucial source of jobs and purchasing power, 
heavy industrialization was—in the end—a blight more than a blessing. The oil companies and 
shoe factories, among others, devalued and in many cases contaminated the land they occupied. 
Not to mention the city’s industrial districts were, moreover, twice responsible for the fires that 
ravaged the urban landscape in both 1908 and 1973. In fact, 1908 marked the beginning of what 
became an unbalanced relationship between Chelsea and its industry, as the latter drove property 
taxes skyward.  Chelsea collected fewer property taxes from the city’s industries—many of 
which were favored by federal policy; without the benefit of sales tax—Massachusetts did not 
issue a statewide sales tax until 1966—the city’s predominantly low-income residents bore the 
burden of city government and municipal programs. For Chelsea, industrialization was a double-
edged phenomenon. While it did increase and maintain the livelihood of Chelsea and her 
residents—most notably Jews—its  continued presence pushed the city deeper and deeper into a 
cycle of industrial dependence that erupted in fire and ended—at the close of the twentieth 
century—in the lap of a growing Latino population.1
One of the main differences between the Jewish and Latino experience in Chelsea was 
the extent to which public opinion influenced municipal policy and the distribution of financial 
support. After the fire of 1908 and 1973, the rebuilding efforts disfavored ethnic populations by 
choosing not to tend to the needs of the lower class. Chelsea did not build affordable housing for 
its expanding ethnic and working-class communities. Fire codes implemented after the 1908 
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conflagration disproportionately affected Jews—the previous inhabitants of wooden shacks and 
tenements—who could not afford to live in new buildings. As for the reconstruction efforts after 
the fire of 1973, the city chose not to replace the modest dwellings that housed Latinos before the 
conflagration. Instead, the city’s urban renewal project amended the former, heavily Latino 
residential district into the industrial development area and ignored the question of housing 
altogether.  Jews, however, fared better in the reconstruction environment because the fire had 
made commercial property available at a time when Boston’s industries were expanding outside 
the city limits.  In the absence of federal or state relief, the Board of Control relied heavily on 
pro-commercial policies in order to jolt the economy and moreover, rescue the city’s industries 
and livelihood. As a result, those who invested in the city were industrial conglomerates and not 
federal or state monies placed at the discretion of relief authorities. The 1908 reconstruction 
policy relied on the free-market system to bring capital and financial confidence back into the 
city, and thus local politics had little—if any—control over who benefitted from the inflow of 
capital. In the wake of such practices, Jews prospered because industrial expansion was entirely 
dependent upon labor.  Wages fueled the growth of the Jewish population, and rapid production 
during wartime primed the population for unprecedented social ascension. Latinos, on the other 
hand, had no such luck. After the fire of 1973, the federal and state government placed urban 
renewal funds—meant to remedy urban decline—directly  into the hands of the municipality—as 
was consistent with the policy of the Housing and Community Development Act. Yet although 
the intent of government assistance was to save the community from deindustrialization, the 
money only served to reinforce the estrangement of Latinos from the community. The 
municipality built Murray Industrial Park for the purpose of attracting “community-responsible” 
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businesses and by the same token, the city constructed luxury housing at Admiral’s Hill in order 
to entice “respectable workers” to buy and live in Chelsea. These two projects invested federal 
and state funds directly into the white-collar community without equally considering the needs of 
the low-income residents. Moreover, neither industrial development nor upper-class housing 
produced the uplifting effect that the municipality anticipated. Murray Industrial Park attracted 
Boston-based firms looking to save on rent and capitalize on space. And similarly, luxury 
housing along the waterfront caught the eyes of some of Boston’s young, white professionals 
interested in living above their means. Unlike widespread industrial development after 1908, 
federally-funded urban renewal projects provided temporary financial gain instead of continuous 
economic stimulation. The white-collar businesses and people that the urban renewal funds 
advantaged were isolated fixtures in a working-class environment that needed affordable housing 
and employment opportunities. The fire had accelerated deindustrialization and destroyed low-
income housing, both to the absolute detriment of the Chelsea’s Latino population. 2
The comparable circumstances but divergent paths of Jewish and Latino Chelsea revealed 
the limits of social ascension during the second half of the twentieth century. The onset of 
deindustrialization and the simultaneous expansion of the Latino community confined the 
newcomers to the inner-urban environment. In the passionate words of Isildro Vega “the Burger 
Kings and the supermarkets don’t pay anything, you see?. . . I had a good job in the factory. . . I 
had health insurance and vacation days. . .when they left we lost our jobs.”  Arriving during the 
first wave of Latino migration, Isildro watched as Latinos inherited a city that had less and less 
opportunities as the decades wore on. After the fire of 1973, some Hispanics became proprietors 
and opened up businesses along Broadway and in Bellingham Square, but for the bulk of the 
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population, there was not enough work to meet the growing demand. By 1990, Chelsea housed a 
reservoir of human capital. Oversaturated with an exploding population of Central Americans—
and especially Salvadorans—Chelsea was a basin of cheap labor. Temporary labor agencies such 
as Labor Ready and Workers Help capitalized on the demand for work and in many cases 
exploited undocumented Central American workers. Without papers and without the means to 
choose, Chelsea’s Central American population found itself trapped in a labor system that not 
only prevented economic mobility but maintained social oppression. 3
~ 
 On October 14, 2009 the Chelsea Record published an article on the anniversary of the 
Great Fire of 1973. Entirely different from the Globe’s retrospective of 1908, the article neither 
dramatized the unknown origins of the conflagration nor described how Chelsea rose up from the 
ashes. Unlike the first fire, there was no urban myth to be told and no burning questions to be 
answered.  According to the newspaper’s editors, the city was already “cascading into the 
ground” at the time of the fire. It had been run down by years of neglect and vacated by the 
families and businesses who had once called it home. The article did not recollect memories of 
people fleeing in the streets, but drinking in a bar. The fear that had filled the air in 1908 was all 
but absent in a city that had grown accustomed to smoke and decay. As devastating as the fire of 
1973 was, Chelsea was a city under fire and it had been for quite some time.4
 The less than sensational storytelling of the Great Fire of 1973 said a lot about how 
Chelsea had changed since 1908. There was no “board of control” after the second fire and there 
was no period of prosperity in the years to follow. In 1919, the population of Chelsea peaked at 
52,662 persons and from then onward the city grappled with continuous demographic decline. 
89 
 
Thirty-one years later, in 1950, the Mystic River Bridge carved the urban landscape with miles 
of roadway and dispossessed the city of its most valuable terrain. Urban crisis grabbed hold of 
the city during the 1960s—culminating with the Gulf Oil explosion of 1969—and by the time 
fire erupted yet again, Chelsea had already been singled out as a chief recipient of federal and 
state assistance. While Chelsea had always been a city of working-class people, in 1973 the 
residents were living in an urban milieu that was filthy from the residue of industry and subject 
to the whims of local politics. During the 1970s and 1980s, the city spiraled into fiscal crisis 
under the weight of deindustrialization and fell into the hands of corrupt mayors and city 
officials. In 1991, the federal government placed Chelsea into receivership, and the city has not 
held municipal elections since.5
Though it is true that all of Chelsea has suffered in the aftermath of receivership and 
municipal indigence, Latinos have carried the burden of urban decline. In recent years, the 
phenomena of undocumented immigration and temporary employment, neither of which applied 
to the Jewish population, have deepened Latino exploitation and economic hardship.  Nowadays, 
a variety of businesses and people organize and dispatch Chelsea’s Latino workforce to factories, 
construction sites, and other worksites throughout Metro Boston. The workers are loaded into 
vans and station wagons and transported to their temporary place of employment. Jobs are 
allocated on a first-come, first-service basis, and those who wait in line are not guaranteed work.  
The jobs provided by the agencies include backbreaking, often perilous activities, that workers 
other than the undocumented would not dare touch. Clearing rubble at a construction site near 
the Liberty Tree Mall in Danvers—which is located in Essex County, north of Chelsea—was just 
one example of the type of work performed by Chelsea’s undocumented. Other examples paint a 
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more horrid picture.  Employed by a produce company and working in a damp and cold 
environment, one Latino worker was instructed by his superior to remove lead paint with his bare 
hands and without the necessary protective clothing.  Shortly thereafter, the man ended up in the 
hospital with lead poisoning. His temporary employer denied any responsibility for the worksite 
injury, and insisted that the man never worked for him. In the post-industrial city, the 
exploitation of labor has reached new heights. Chelsea’s Latino migrants have few rights as 
temporary laborers and even fewer rights as undocumented workers. Just like the Jews before 
them, the Latinos came to Chelsea to work and find a better life. Yet this time around, there was 
significantly less work to be found. The Latinos may have replaced the Jews, but more 
importantly, white-collar industrial parks and empty space had replaced the factories.6
Yet leaving the matrix of urban phenomena aside, the one factor that remained constant 
throughout the twentieth century was the remarkable vitality of Chelsea’s ethnic communities. 
The Jews and Latinos of Chelsea breathed life into a city that was badly regarded and poorly 
kempt. At the beginning of the twentieth century, one Boston newspaper called Chelsea “an 
irretrievable mistake,” and by the time Latino migrants arrived, the city’s downtrodden character 
had already inspired the term “dead as Chelsea.”  Although the city may have had a bad 
reputation in the greater Boston area, among Jewish and Latino circles the city was known for its 
unique ethnic character. During the era of the Jews, Chelsea was “America’s most Jewish city.” 
And after their religious community bequeathed the township to the Latinos, Chelsea became 
“un pueblo tranquilo,” and one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the state. By 1980, Latinos 
had become the city’s most populous immigrant group and by 2000, Hispanics comprised almost 
fifty percent of the population. Although constituents of “Old Chelsea”—be they Walter Pratt or 
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the Chelsea Housing Authority—often frowned upon the development of ethnic identity, others 
flocked to the city for exactly the same reason. Jewish and Latino kinship networks brought 
vitality to a city that no longer kept the interest of second generation Americans and middle-class 
citizens. Although Chelsea had—and has—its fair share of issues, it also had a unique ethnic 
magnetism that brought new people to the city’s doorstep. For over a century now, Chelsea has 
been a “city of immigrants” and it is because of them that there is still something to love in the 
small, run-down city. In the words of Jeremiah Murphy reporting for the Boston Globe, “Chelsea 
had it’s problems all right, but I will tell what it also has: an indefinable charm.”7
 
1 “Understanding Our Tax System: A Primer for Active Citizens,” Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center, 
accessed February 16, 2011, http://onemassachusetts.org/getinformed/understandingourtaxsystem.  
2 “The Great Chelsea Fire,” Chelsea Historical Society; “The Second Great Chelsea Fire,” Chelsea Historical 
Society.  
3 “Isildro Vega,” interview.  
4 “Thirty-six years ago- Chelsea Fire of 1973,” Chelsea Record. Date? 
5 “Chelsea’s Population Through the Years,” Chelsea Historical Society. 
6  Rodriguez, “Shadow Work Force Faces A Daily Grind.” Full cite? 
7 Jeremiah Murphy, “Jeremiah Murphy, poor Chelsea Hangs in there,” Boston Globe, October 16, 1982; Heaton, “A 
Study in Industrial Evolution.”  
 
 
92 
 
Bibliography 
 
Oral History Interviews 
Flora Cook, interviewed by Lake Coreth, 2011.  
Norman Finkelstein, interviewed by Lake Coreth, 2011.  
          interviewed by Casey Fishman and Adina Bernstein, 2009.   
Father Terence Moran, interviewed by Lake Coreth, 2011. 
Isildro Vega, interviewed by Lake Coreth, 2011.  
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
Boston Globe 
Boston Herald 
Chelsea Evening Record 
Chelsea Gazette 
Chelsea Record  
Current Affairs 
Jewish Advocate 
 
Archive Material 
Archival Collections, Chelsea Public Library, Chelsea, Massachusetts 
Special Collections, Chelsea Historical Society, Chelsea, Massachusetts 
 
Books, Journals, Dissertations, Reports, Censuses 
Alvarado, Blanca. Exploitation in the Shadows: Unauthorized Latina Immigrants Tell Their    
 Story. PhD diss., Boston University, 2007.  
 
Antin, Mary. The Promised Land. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.  
Barber, Llana. Latino Migration and the New Global Cities: Transnationalism, Race, and Urban   
Crisis in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1945-2000. PhD diss., Boston College, 2010.  
 
Braverman, William. The Ascent of Boston’s Jews, 1630-1918. PhD diss., Harvard University,  
1990.  
 
Chelsea Commission on Hispanic Affairs. Hispanics in Boston. Boston: UMass Boston, 1990.  
Clarke, Margaret Harriman. Chelsea in the 20th Century. Charlestown: Arcadia Publishing, 2004.  
Frej, William and Harry Specht. “The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974:  
Implications for Policy and Planning.” The Social Science Review 52, no.2 (1976): 275-
292.  
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor. Volume I: Population and Social Statistics, 1895.  
Boston, Wright & Potter Print., state printers. Boston, MA, 1896 
 
  ------------------------------------------------      Volume I: Population and Social Statistics, 1905.  
Boston, Wright & Potter Print., state printers. Boston, MA, 1909 
 
  ------------------------------------------------      Volume I: Population and Social Statistics, 1915.  
Boston, Wright & Potter Print., state printers. Boston, MA, 1918 
 
Pratt, Walter Merriam. The Burning of Chelsea. Boston: Sampson Publishing Company, 1908.  
 
Sarna, Jonathan D, Ellen Smith, and Scott Martin Kosofsky, eds. The Jews of Boston. New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.  
 
Sawislak, Karen. Smoldering City Chicagoans and the Great Fire, 1871-1874. Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1995.  
 
Uriarte, Miren, Paul Osterman and Edwin Melendez, eds. Latinos in Boston: Confronting  
 Poverty, Building Community. Boston: The Boston Foundation, 1993.  
 
Uriarte, Miren, Phil Granberry, Megan Halloran, Susan Kelly, Rob Kramer and Sandra Winkler.  
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Colombians: A scan of needs of recent Latin 
American immigrants to the Boston area. MPP diss., University of Massachusetts 
Boston, 2003.  
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Characteristics of the Population, 1950. U.S Government Printing  
Office. Washington D.C, 1952. 
 
  -----------------------------   Characteristics of the Population, 1960. U.S Government Printing  
Office. Washington D.C, 1963. 
 
  -----------------------------   Characteristics of the Population, 1970. U.S Government Printing  
Office. Washington D.C, 1973. 
 
  -----------------------------   Characteristics of the Population, 1980. U.S Government Printing  
Office. Washington D.C, 1983. 
 
  -----------------------------   Characteristics of the Population, 1990. U.S Government Printing  
Office. Washington D.C, 1993. 
 
 
 
 
